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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RAUL ROBERTO CARRILLO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20060766-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for manslaughter, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (West 2004), based on a bench verdict entered by 
the Honorable Deno Himonas, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: If this Court reaches the merits, has defendant established that the trial court 
clearly erred in finding that when defendant knowingly stabbed the victim, defendant was 
aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial risk that death would result? 
Standard of Review: In this case, the State maintains that the merits should not be 
reached because (1) defendant failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and verdict and (2) did not preserve the arguments he now raises or invited the 
errors he alleges on appeal. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, ^ 19 
(marshaling); Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f^ 15 (preservation and invited error). 
If the merits are considered, the trial court findings underlying a bench verdict'" shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given [by the appellate 
court] to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.555 State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987) (quoting Utah R. Civil P. 52(a)). Accord In re 
Z.D., 2006 UT 54, Iffl 31-33 & 40, 147 P.3d 401; State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 
1988). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
A defendant commits manslaughter if he "recklessly causes the death of another.55 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(l)(a). A defendant acts "recklessly or maliciously55: 
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (West 2004). SeeAddendumA for the complete text of these 
and any other statutes or rules cited in argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2004, defendant and his brother were charged with the murder of Daniel Johnson, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004) (R. 1-2). A 
plea bargain was reached whereby defendant, who was already facing incarceration arising 
2 
from a probation violation and charges in another case, would plead guilty to third-degree 
aggravated assault, if his brother plead guilty to second-degree felony manslaughter (R. 56-
66, 78-92). Guilty pleas to the amended charges were entered, but subsequently set aside 
after the victim's family objected to the reduction (R. 39-40, 98-102, 104). The murder 
charge was then reinstated (id). 
On May 8, 2006, defendant and his brother waived their right to a jury trial and a 
three-day bench trial commenced (R. 153-54, 167-70). The trial court acquitted both 
defendants of murder, but found defendant guilty of second-degree felony manslaughter (R. 
169-70; R201: 262-66). See Addendum B (Trial Court's Oral Findings). On July 20, 2006, 
defendant was sentenced to one-to-fifteen-years imprisonment, to run consecutively to the 
other sentences he was then serving (R. 169-70). Defendant timely appealed (R.189). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
The evening started out simply enough. Some friends asked eighteen-year-old Daniel 
Johnson and his sixteen-year-old girlfriend Chelsea Stout to a party at the friends' apartment 
on Windsor Circle (R201: 30, 112-13, 140; Exhibit 13). Others subsequently joined the 
1A sufficiency claim is fact-dependent and obligates an appellant to marshal the 
evidence that supports the trial court's findings and verdict. See Martinez, 2007 UT 42, f^ 
17 & n.3; In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, ^ 39. As will discussed, infra at 18-25, defendant has 
not met that obligation here. 
The State recites the facts in the light most favorable to the findings and presents 
conflicting evidence only "to the extent necessary to clarify the issue[] raised on appeal." 
See ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 250 n.l (Utah App.), cert 
denied, 943 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). 
3 
party, including defendant and his younger brother, Alexandra Carrillo (R201: 113-15). 
Daniel and Chelsea did not know defendant or his brother prior to the party (R201: 145). 
Over the next several hours, Daniel, Chelsea, and defendant drank brandy and/or beer 
(R201: 116-18). Chelsea felt "buzzed," but not drunk (R201: 179-80). Defendant was "a 
little bit drunk." See Addendum D (Police Interview of Defendant at 16). Chelsea and 
Daniel also snorted a "line" of cocaine (R201: 120).2 
At some point, Chelsea and defendant discussed body tattoos (R201: 117-18, 184). 
Defendant showed her one of his tattoos, a "Joker" on his right forearm (R201: 46). He also 
said she was pretty and asked why she was with Daniel (R201: 185). Chelsea later repeated 
the comment to Daniel, but Daniel did nothing about it (R201: 185, 202). 
In the early morning, a "really tipsy.. .Tongan guy" arrived at the party (R201: 121). 
He knocked over some objects and was asked to leave (R201:122). He left but then returned 
with five big male Islanders (R201: 123 &146). The Islanders pushed their way into the 
living room. Chelsea confronted them: "Why do you guys want to come and start shit at 
somebody else's house? Get out of here" (R201:123 & 147). One Islander threatened: "Get 
out of my face or I will hit you" (R201: 147). Chelsea challenged, "Hit me," and the Islander 
pushed her to the floor (R201: 123-24 & 148). Daniel fled out the front door (R201: 124& 
148-49). Chelsea saw him leave, knew his car keys were in the bedroom, and walked down 
2At trial, Chelsea admitted that she had previously falsely denied using cocaine 
(R201: 119-20, 176-77). She testified that "pretty much everyone" at the party used 
cocaine, but she did not know if defendant had (R201: 117, 120). 
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the hall to retrieve them (id). Meanwhile, defendant and the others legitimately in the 
apartment fought the invading Islanders (Add. D at 4-5, 7-8, 17-18). 
Chelsea found Daniel's car keys and climbed out the back bedroom window (R201: 
124, 128). She saw Daniel lying on top of a carport behind the apartment (R201:124,128-
29, 151). He shouted to her to get his car (id.). He jumped to the ground and got in the car 
on the passenger side. Chelsea drove out the driveway (R201: 130).3 
Just as Chelsea turned into the street in front of the apartment, Daniel realized he had 
dropped his cell telephone in the driveway and asked Chelsea to get it (R201: 130). She 
stopped the car and got out, closing the driver's door behind her (R201:130). When she was 
approximately 7-12 feet from the car, she hear the car door open and looked back (R201: 
131-32, 187-90). It was dark, but the car was illuminated by its interior dome light and a 
nearby street light (R201: 180). 
Daniel was now seated in the driver's seat with his legs outside the car (R201: 131, 
152). Defendant was standing inside the open driver's door, leaning over Daniel, punching 
him (R201: 132, 156). Chelsea saw defendant's brother walk over to the car and hand 
something to defendant (R201: 132, 136, 156-57). She could not see what the object was 
3Chelsea testified that two women were in the bedroom, but stated they did not 
follow her to the car (R201: 153-54). In earlier statements, she said the women got into 
the car (R201: 200). Though defendant notes this and other inconsistencies in her 
testimony, see Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt] at 4-5, the trial court found that these 
peripheral inconsistencies did not undermine the credibility of Chelsea's eyewitness 
account of the stabbing, which the court found "relatively consistent" (R201: 264). (Add. 
B). Defendant does not challenge this finding on appeal. 
5 
until defendant flipped his hand and she saw the open blade of a blue butterfly knife (R201: 
132, 137, 190-92). Without a word, defendant plunged the knife into Daniel's inner thigh, 
about five inches above the knee (R201: 132, 137, 192). 
Chelsea ran over and hit defendant (R201: 133). He yelled, "Get this bitch off me" 
and hit her (R201: 133-34, 157, 159). She fell onto the street and was kicked by more than 
one person until one of her ribs cracked and she blacked out (R201: 134, 158, 183-84). 
At some point, the police were called (R201: 30).4 
When the police arrived, Chelsea was conscious, but still in the street (R201: 134, 
160-61). The police escorted her back into the apartment and questioned her about the fight 
with the Islanders (R201: 62). Chelsea volunteered nothing about the stabbing, because she 
was confused, scared, and believed Daniel was in the apartment (R201: 59, 161-64, 187). 
In fact, Daniel had fled. After he was stabbed, Daniel drove to his mother's home, 
about eight blocks from the Windsor apartment (R201: 31, 80). During the short drive, he 
lost enough blood to create a pool one-quarter to one-half inch deep on the driver's side floor 
and more blood on the front seat (R201: 86). When Daniel pulled into his mother's 
driveway, he hit the side of her house with the car (R201: 81). He then fell or was pulled 
4Defendant asserts that a neighbor called the police at 4:59 a.m., citing only his 
counsel's opening statement. See Br.Aplt. at 18-20 & 22-23 (citing R201: 19 & 22). He 
makes other claims, citing to the preliminary hearing. See, e.g., Br.Aplt at 3, 5-8, & 18-
20 (citing R. 200), As will be discussed, a sufficiency claim is limited to the evidence 
admitted at trial. See State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, % 14, 999 P.2d 1252. 
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onto the front lawn, where his brother attempted first aid (R201: 51,81, 89). Another pool 
of blood formed under him on the grass. See Exhibits 10, 11 & 12. 
At 5:07 a.m., the police were dispatched to Daniel's mother's home for what they 
thought was an injury-accident (R201: 80-81, 86). Simultaneously, emergency medical 
technicians [EMTs] were dispatched (R201: 82). 
Police Officers Densley and Burnham found Daniel lying on the lawn with his brother 
next to him (R201: 81-82). Densley looked inside the car and realized that something more 
than a car accident had occurred. Burnham asked defendant what happened (R201: 86, 89). 
Daniel replied, "A big Polynesian stabbed me" (R201: 90, 86).5 
The officers did not provide additional first aid to Daniel because "medical was en 
route" (R201: 82,89). "Just a couple of minutes" after the officers arrived, the EMTs arrived 
and immediately treated Daniel (R201:83, 89). "Very quickly," not more than five minutes 
later, they transported him to the hospital where the medical treatment continued (R201: 87, 
97-98). Nevertheless, Daniel died (R201: 93). 
The medical examiner concluded that Daniel bled to death from a stab wound in his 
left leg (R201:94). The stab wound—most likely made by a single-edged knife blade—was 
3 lA inches deep and slightly less than lA inch wide (R201:100-01). The blade struck and cut 
5Though defendant is not Polynesian, the trial court noted that even the Islanders 
asked if he was (R201: 263; Add. D at 4). Despite this, defendant suggests that Daniel 
was identifying someone else as the assailant. See Br.Aplt. at 8. However, the trial court 
found that defendant truthfully confessed to being the assailant (R201: 263-64). On 
appeal, defendant does not challenge this finding. 
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"a major branch of the femoral artery, which is the main artery which provides blood to the 
leg" (R201:97). 
The doctor explained, "Once an artery is cut, it will with every pulse of the heart, 
every beat of the heart, continue to leak blood until it is either closed, sutured, tied off' (id). 
If such an injury is untreated, the individual continues to lose blood and goes into shock 
(R201: 97-98). Blood pressure may initially increase, but as blood loss continues, pressure 
decreases. Organs—first peripheral and then central—begin to die as they are deprived of 
oxygen, until finally the lungs, kidneys, liver, and brain fail (R201: 98). "As the brain 
becomes starved of blood and oxygen it will begin to lose functions" and the injured 
individual will have decreased intellectual ability and be unable to perform complex tasks 
(R201: 99). Basic life-sustaining functions deteriorate and cease (id.). 
In Daniel's case, the blade only partially severed the profunda femoris, a "significant" 
artery and one of the two branches of the femoral artery, the main artery in the leg (R201: 
101-02). A partial transection of an artery is "actually a little more dangerous of an injury 
than a complete cut" (R201: 102). "Arteries are elastic, so they are under some degree of 
tension. So if you cut it completely there is going to be a pulling back and somewhat of a 
self-sealing of the artery. If you only cut it partially that pulling back and self-sealing cannot 
occur, so it will bleed more copiously" (R201: 102). Here, the artery was "certainly cut 
enough so that it was going to bleed" (R201: 103). Death would not be immediate, but 
would evolve slowly over "at least" a number of minutes (R201: 105). 
8 
Because the wound Daniel received could not "self correct," medical intervention was 
necessary to prevent death (R201: 105). In theory, the earlier adequate medical treatment 
begins, the "greater the likelihood" of survival and, hypothetically, any delay in receiving 
medical treatment contributes to the deterioration of the injured individual (R201: 105-06). 
But the irreversibility of the damage largely depends on how rapidly blood is initially lost 
(R201:105-06,110-11). Consequently, when blood loss is acute and quick, even "pouring" 
blood and fluids back into the individual—as occurred here at the emergency room—will not 
prevent death (R201: 97-98, 109). 
After Chelsea learned that Daniel had died, she provided the police with a complete 
account of what she witnessed (R201: 134,165, 169-71,173,195-99,205). She identified 
defendant and his brother from a photo-spread and, though she was mistaken as to 
defendant's first name, she also identified him by his "Joker" tattoo (R201:41 -46,55,71-73, 
204-205). 
Defendant and his brother were arrested. The brother refused to speak to the police, 
but defendant waived his right to remain silent and was interviewed (R201: 33-36). The 
interview was recorded, transcribed, and admitted into evidence.6 See Exhibit 1 (DVD 
Recording of Police Interview) & Add. D (Transcript). 
6Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of his statements to the police. 
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Defendant described the fight inside the apartment as "crazy" and a "big old rumble" 
(Add. D at 4 & 7). He was "swinging" so much that he likely hit his friends (Add. D at 7). 
After a few minutes, the fight continued outside (Add. D at 4). 
In discussing what happened outside, defendant initially claimed he did not have a 
knife and did not stab anyone (Add. D at 10). He then admitted that he fought with Daniel, 
but insisted that he could not "remember" having or using a knife (Add. D at 11,13, 15-16-
20). Yet, defendant would not say the eyewitness(es) were lying when they identified him 
as the assailant: "Well if that's that then, if they seen me stab him then it was me that did it 
±&T (Add. D at 12 Sell, 14).7 
Defendant continued: "If I did stab him, you know what I am saying? If I did stab him 
you know what I am saying I want to, I know it probably would have been an accident or 
something. I honestly can't remember" (Add. D. at 13). Defendant acknowledged that the 
police "got" him, but persisted that he had no memory of the stabbing (Add. D at 14-15). At 
one point, the detective asked: "[W]hy didn't you just hit him with your fist [ijnstead of 
stabbing him? (Add. D at 15). Defendant replied, "Honestly, I'm drawing a blank there" 
(id.). Three questions later, the detective directly asked, "And you did stab him in the leg, 
right," and defendant replied, "I guess I did" (id.). 
Defendant said he did not intend to kill Daniel when he stabbed him (Add. D at 15). 
He claimed that he was scared that night because he heard that, in general, Islanders like "to 
7The police told defendant there was more than one eyewitness (Add. D at 9). 
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shoot" and feared that these Islanders might be armed (Add. D at 15, 20-21). He said he 
acted out of "self defense, you know, I [was] just trying to get out of there, just, I was scared 
. . . Save myself, because I didn't know who was who or what was what I'm saying and that's 
kind of, I don't know you know, I'm not trying to bullshit you, you guys got me for this, but 
honestly I don't remember having the knife. All I remember is fighting" (Add. D at 15-16). 
The detective asked if he was out of control, angry, or drunk (Add. D at 16). Defendant again 
replied, "I was scared. There was a whole bunch of shit going on. I didn't know, I know 
how those gangsters I know how gangsters are saying there's guns, everything, you know 
what I am saying so I was [j]ust trying to get out of there as safe as possible" (id)} 
Defendant explained that he was not denying that he stabbed Daniel, but that there 
was "just so much commotion you know what I'm saying. I don't remember everything" 
(Add. D at 19). He then detailed the fight with the Islanders inside the apartment. When he 
exited the apartment, he walked passed Daniel, who was seated in the car (Add. D at 4,6,16, 
18). Defendant claimed he did not recognize Daniel, though they had been together for 
several hours. He thought Daniel might be one of the big Islanders who invaded the 
apartment, yet described Daniel as "only 57" and "skinner" than defendant (Add. D at 5-6, 
16, 18; R201: 146). Defendant walked over to the car after Daniel allegedly said 
8At trial, defendant did not claim that he acted in self-defense. His counsel argued 
instead, that the fear defendant expressed supported the affirmative defense of extreme 
emotional distress, which defense would reduce murder to second-degree felony 
manslaughter, the crime of which defendant was convicted albeit under a different theory 
(R201: 237-38). See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203(4) & 76-5-205(l)(b) (Add. A). 
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"something" to him (Add. D at 18). Defendant claimed that Daniel reached through the car 
window and hit him (Add. D at 16,18, 24-26). Defendant admitted that he then opened the 
car door and began punching Daniel (id.). Defendant alleged that Daniel kicked him (id.). 
The detective asked if defendant stabbed Daniel to stop him from kicking him (Add. 
D at 20). Defendant replied, "No, I was just trying to get out of there. No, I wasn't trying 
to kill nobody. I'm not like that. Even in the house you know what I'm saying? I didn't 
have no knife or nothing so I was just fighting" (Add. C at 20). The detective asked: "So 
you're still saying that you didn't have a knife in the car?" (Add. D at 20). Defendant 
conceded, "I guess I did have a knife," but then continued to vacillate (id.). 
Defendant said fighting was a violation of his probation, but admitted that he liked to 
fist fight (Add. D at 18, 20-21). But he distinguished between a knife fight and a fist fight: 
If I had a knife, you know, if I stabbed him, [i]t wasn't intent. You know what 
I am saying? I didn't mean for nobody dying, I didn't mean to stab nobody. 
If I did stab people you know, I'm not that kind of person. I would like to 
[fist] fight more . . . . 
I'm not like that, I'm more of a [fist] fighter you know. See my finger is 
messed up from fighting? I've got scars from fighting. I love the fight. I'm 
not a person to stab somebody or shoot somebody. I'm a man you know and 
that's the way I like to go it. Knuckle up. And if I had a knife you know I'm 
sorry for having the knife and I stabbed him I'm sorry for it. It wasn't intent. 
(Add. D at 21-22). But ultimately, defendant fully confessed (Add. D at 22-25). Detective 
Parks: We know you had a knife. Come on, you're nearly there for Christ sakes. 
Defendant: And I'm trying to get the best way out of this that I can you know. 
Parks: Ok, stop, you're nearly there. You had a knife right? 
12 
Defendant: I had a knife. 
Parks: There you go. And you stabbed him in the leg, didn't you? 
Defendant: I stabbed him in the leg. 
Parks: Alright, and why did you do that? 
Defendant: Probably to get him out of there so he'd stop hitting me, stop 
getting the [b]est of me, you know what I'm saying? 
Parks: Ok. And where was he sitting when you stabbed him with a knife? 
Defendant: In his car. 
Parks: Ok, now why is that so hard to say? 
Defendant: It ain't. 
(Add. D at 22). They further discussed what led up to the stabbing (Add. D at 22-23). 
Parks: So he's sitting in his car and you're on foot and you exchange words? 
Defendant: Yea. 
Parks: And then you walk over and open the door and start fighting? 
Defendant: No, I was on the driver's side, the driver's side and that's when 
he said something and then he hit me and so I opened the door and started 
hitting him back. 
Parks: Did he start hitting you through the window or something? 
Defendant: Yes. 
Parks: What did he hit you with? 
Defendant: His fist. 
13 
Parks: So then you opened the door and stabbed him, not meaning to kill him 
but stabbed him? Not meanign [sic] to kill him. 
Defendant: Yea. I'm not a murderer you know I like to fight. 
Parks: What the hell you doing with a knife? What the hell were you doing? 
Defendant: There was just so much commotion and confrontation going on I 
was just trying to get out of there safe. 
Parks: Were you in his way? I mean were you like standing in front of his car 
so he couldn't turn and leave? 
Defendant: Uh huh. 
Parks: Then why would he exchange words with you? 
Defendant: I don't know. I don't know. There was just so much shit going 
on. 
Detective Siebeneck: What did he say to you? 
Defendant: He said like "who the fuck are you?" or "what the fuck do you 
want?" or some shit like that. And I was like "what?" 
Parks: So he called you on or something? 
Defendant: Yea, he said something and I was like "what" as I was walking by 
and I looked at him and he hit me. 
Parks: That would make me angry too. So he said "who the fuck are you"? 
Defendant: Yea, he said "who the fuck are you" or "what the fuck you want"? 
Some shit like that. 
Siebeneck: Just popping off? 
Defendant: Yea, just popping off at the mouth you know and then when I got 
up closer to him I was saying "well who the fuck are you" and everybody's 
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adrenalin pumping seeing as we just got in a big old scuffle and so I was like 
what the fuck and then I got hit and so I just started hitting him back. 
Parks: So he hit you through his open drivers [sic] window? 
Det Siebeneck: That's kind of chicken shit isn't it? Wouldn't even get out of 
the car. 
Defendant: It was kind of chicken shit for me to stab him too. It wasn't 
something I intended or nothing. 
(Add D at 23-25). 
After defendant stabbed Daniel, he and his brother drove away from the apartment, 
but then circled back (Add. D at 8). Defendant alleged that the police stopped him, but that 
he said he was looking for a lost necklace (id.). He did not tell them that Daniel was injured 
or needed first aid. 
Before rendering the verdict, the trial court reviewed the DVD recording of 
defendant's interview and "rereviewed it and then reviewed portions of it again" (R201:263-
64). Each time, the court became more convinced of the confession's truthfulness (id.). The 
court also compared Chelsea's trial testimony with her earlier statements and found the two 
inconsistent in many respects, but nevertheless credible and consistent regarding the stabbing 
(R201: 208 & 264). The court also considered the nature of the stab wound (R201: 264). 
The court found the evidence insufficient to establish murder and acquitted defendant 
and his brother of that charge (R201: 264-265) (Add. B). The court then found that the 
evidence established that defendant recklessly killed Daniel and convicted defendant of the 
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lesser offense of manslaughter (id.). The court did not find defendant's brother guilty of any 
offense (id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's admissions and confession establish that when he stabbed Daniel 
Johnson, defendant was aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial risk that death 
would result. Chelsea's eyewitness account and the wound itself also support that defendant 
recklessly killed Daniel and is guilty of manslaughter. 
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial court's reliance on the State's 
evidence. Instead, he argues that, even when the State's evidence is believed, it is 
insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, defendant contends that the evidence is 
insufficient to establish that he was subjectively aware of, but consciously disregarded, a risk 
that death would result (subjective intent). He further argues that the evidence does not 
establish that a stab in the thigh creates a substantial risk of death (objective risk). 
This Court need not reach the merits of defendant's sufficiency claim because he 
failed to marshal the evidence supporting the challenged findings and verdict. Moreover, his 
claims of errors are largely unpreserved or were invited by concessions he made below. 
In the trial court, defense counsel admitted that if the State's evidence was believed, 
it was legally sufficient to establish murder. In other words, that if believed, there was a 
factual and legal basis to find that defendant, with the intent to cause serious bodily injury, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life or; acting with depraved indifference to 
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life, defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death. Defense counsel's admission 
regarding murder necessarily was also a concession that the State's evidence, if believed, was 
legally sufficient to establish murder's lesser included offense of manslaughter. This is 
because proof of a higher offense necessarily includes proof of its lesser offense. 
Consequently, defendant is now precluded from claiming for the first time on appeal that the 
State's evidence is insufficient to establish the elements of reckless manslaughter, that is, that 
he was subjectively aware of, but consciously disregarded a substantial risk that death would 
result from the stabbing 
Similarly, defendant waived his right to claim on appeal that he was unaware of a 
substantial risk of death. In the trial court, the prosecutor argued that there was no factual 
basis to find that defendant was unaware of the risk of death and, therefore, no basis for the 
court to consider the lesser offense of negligent homicide. Defense counsel did not object 
or claim there was a factual basis to find that he was unaware of the risk. Nor did he ask the 
trial court to otherwise consider negligent homicide. Defense counsel's failure to assert this 
claim below bars him from now claiming that the trial court clearly erred in not finding 
negligent homicide. 
Alternatively, if the merits of defendant's sufficiency claim are reached, the clear 
weight of the evidence supports the trial court's findings that defendant recklessly caused 
Daniel's death when he knowingly plunged a knife 3 Vi inches into Daniel's thigh and 
partially cut a major artery. Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT 
DEFENDANT RECKLESSLY KILLED THE VICTIM AND SUPPORTS 
HIS MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION. 
In his police interview, defendant claimed he only liked to fist fight. He insisted that 
he was not the type of person that would use a knife in a fight, because he had no intent to 
kill. He characterized a person who uses a knife in a fight "a murderer." Yet, in the same 
interview, he confessed that he stabbed Daniel Johnson with a knife, while Daniel was 
unarmed and seated in a car. The trial court credited defendant's admissions and confession, 
as well as the State's other evidence, found that defendant did not intentionally kill Daniel, 
and acquitted him of murder. The court correctly found, however, that defendant recklessly 
caused Daniel's death in that, when defendant knowingly stabbed Daniel, he was aware of, 
but consciously disregarded, a substantial risk that death would result. Based on these 
findings, the court properly convicted defendant of second-degree felony manslaughter, one 
of the lesser included offenses defendant asked the trial court to consider. 
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial court's reliance on the State's 
evidence. Instead, he claims that even when the evidence is believed, it is insufficient to 
establish reckless manslaughter. See Br.Aplt. at 18-25. This Court need not address the 
substance of defendant's sufficiency challenge because he failed to marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings and verdict. Additionally, defendant failed to preserve 
the claims he now raises and invited the errors he alleges. Alternatively, if the substance of 
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defendant's sufficiency claim is addressed, it lacks merit. Review of the record establishes 
that the clear weight of the evidence, properly marshaled, supports the trial court's finding 
that defendant recklessly killed Daniel 
(A) The Merits of Defendant's Sufficiency Challenge Should Not Be 
Considered Because He Failed to Marshal the Evidence Supporting 
the Trial Court's Findings and Verdict. 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, [an appellate court] must 
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made.'" State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). See also In re Z.D., 2006UT 54,^31-33 &40,147P.3d401. 
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial judge 
to judge the credibility of witnesses.'" Utah R. Civil P. 52(a) (Add. A). For it is the trial 
court, not the appellate court, that "views first-hand witnesses' 'tells' of posture, inflection, 
or mood that strengthen or erode credibility." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, <[{ 24. See also 
Goodman, 763 P.2d at 787 (recognizing that an appellate court reviews "the record to see 
if the clear weight of the evidence, not including demeanor and credibility, is contrary to the 
verdict"). 
In determining if evidence sufficiently supports a bench verdict, an appellate court 
must "distinguish between the situation in which [it] think[s] that if [it] had been the trier of 
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fact [it] would have decided the case differently and the situation in which [it is] firmly 
convinced that [it] would have done so." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, f 34 (citation and 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the appellate court must 
consider "the whole record, or at least that portion of the record to which its attention was 
drawn by the appellant's marshaling obligation or the appellee's response to the appellant's 
marshaled evidence." Id, at \ 39. 
An appellant's marshaling obligation requires him to gather "all of the evidence 
supporting the [the trial court's factual] findings and show that despite the supporting facts, 
and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported [by 
the clear weight of the evidence]." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, \ 17. 
It demands more than simply rearguing favorable facts based on "selective excerpts of the 
record." ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App.), cert 
denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). Instead, an appellant must present "'in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports 
the very findings [he] resists.'" Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 11, 100 P.3d 1177 (quoting 
Neeley v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, Tf 11, 51 P.3d 724). After reconstructing the evidence 
in full, the appellant must "then 'ferret out a fatal flaw'" that clearly proves the judgment 
erroneous. ProMax, 943 P.2d at 255 (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 1991)). 
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When an appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, a reviewing court may 
refuse to consider the merits of a claim.9 See Martinez, 2007 UT 41, \ 19. 
Defendant's most flagrant marshaling failure is his refusal to fully acknowledge his 
confession. Though the transcript of the police interview is 26 pages long, defendant 
summarizes its contents in one paragraph in his Statement of Facts. Compare Br.Aplt. at 9, 
with State's Statement of Facts at 9-15 & Add. D. In the "marshaled evidence" section of 
his brief, see Br.Aplt. at 18-25, defendant never refers to the interview. Nor does he attach 
a copy of the interview to the addenda of his brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(10) (requiring 
parties to attach as addenda "those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance 
to the determination of the appeal"). 
In defendant's one-paragraph summary of the police interview, he does not admit that 
he confessed. He claims instead that he admitted once that he had a knife and once that he 
stabbed Daniel, but only because the police suggested it, and that otherwise he consistently 
denied having a knife or stabbing Daniel. See Br.Aplt. at 9. This is not a fair 
characterization of the interview. See Statement of Facts at 10-15 & Add. D. It also ignores 
the trial court's contrary finding. See R201: 263-64 (Add. B). 
9Defendant suggests that his marshaling duty is lessen in this case because it is 
easier to prove clear error when guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Br.Aplt. at 11-13 (citing In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54). The Utah Supreme Court recently 
clarified that an appellant's marshaling obligation applies "regardless of the standard of 
review at issue." Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ^ 17 n.3. See also United Park City Mines Co. 
v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ffi[ 37-38, 140 P.3d 1200. 
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When the evidence is properly marshaled, it establishes that when defendant was 
interviewed, he initially denied using a knife. Defendant insisted that he was not the type of 
person, "a murderer," who would use a knife in a fight. See Statement of Facts at 10-12. At 
several points, he protested that he did not "remember" a knife or stabbing, but at the same 
time, clarified that he was not denying that he may have stabbed Daniel. Id. Ultimately, he 
folly confessed that h e stabbed Daniel, who was unarmed and seated in a car, and 
characterized his actions as "chicken-shit" (id. at 12-15). See also Add. D. 
In closing, defense counsel argued that the trial court should not credit his confession 
because he simply repeated what the police suggested (R201: 225-30).10 The trial court 
disagreed. It "reviewed and reviewed" the DVD of the confession and found that defendant 
truthfully confessed (R201:263-64) (Add. B). Defendant does not acknowledge this finding. 
In sum, defendant's failure to properly marshal the facts of his confession justifies 
summary rejection of his sufficiency challenge. See Martinez, 2007 UT 42, f^ 19. But 
defendant's marshaling failures extend further. 
Defendant asserts numerous "facts," which he claims establish that the police 
unreasonably delayed giving Daniel first aid and thereby created a substantial risk of death 
that did not otherwise exist. See Br.Aplt. at 18-20. He states that a neighbor called the police 
to the Windsor apartment at 4:59 a.m. See Br.Aplt. at 5 & 8 (citing R201: 19). He claims 
10Defense counsel argued this in closing, but never moved to suppress the 
statements. 
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that the EMTs arrived at 5:15 a.m. at Daniel's mother's home, some 16 minutes later. See 
Br.Aplt. at 10 (citing R201:22). He represents that even though blood squirted from Daniel's 
leg, the officers did not render first aid because they did not believe the injury was serious. 
See Br.Aplt at 19-20 & 22 (citing R200: 45-51). To support these "facts," defendant relies 
on his counsel's opening statement (R201: 19-22) or the preliminary hearing testimony of 
Officer Burnham, who did not testify at trial (R200: 45-51). Defendant's reliance on these 
sources is improper. Only evidence admitted at trial is properly considered in a sufficiency 
claim.11 See State v. Larson, 2000 UT App 106, % 14, 999 P.2d 1252. 
When the evidence is properly marshaled, it establishes that the police were 
dispatched to the Windsor apartment sometime in the morning, but provides no other 
information as to when the call was made or by whom (R201: 30, 134). The police were 
dispatched to Daniel's mother home at 5:07 a.m., but the evidence does not establish when 
the officers arrived (R201: 80-81, 86). The marshaled evidence establishes that Daniel's 
brother attempted first aid and was next to Daniel when the police arrived, though it is 
unclear if he was providing first aid when the police arrived (R201: 51, 81, 90). Officer 
Densley explained that he did not render first aid because he "knew medical was on the way" 
(R201: 83, 89). The EMTs arrived "just a couple of minutes" later and immediately began 
11A portion of the preliminary hearing transcript—Chelsea's testimony— was 
reviewed by the court when it evaluated her credibility (R201: 208). But Officer 
Bumham did not testify at trial and the court did not admit or consider his preliminary 
hearing testimony. Yet, defendant presents Burnham's preliminary hearing testimony as 
trial evidence. 
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medical treatment (R201: 83). Not more than five minutes later, the EMTs transported 
Daniel to the hospital, where medical treatment continued but was unsuccessful (R201: 87, 
93, 97-98, 109).12 
Defendant also does not marshal the evidence concerning the nature of the injury. He 
calls a partial transection of an artery "unusual" and "very unique." Br.Aplt. at 10 & 24. He 
then claims that, but for the uniqueness of this injury, a stab wound in the thigh creates no 
substantial risk of death. Id Again, defendant is merely recasting his counsel's closing 
argument as fact (R201: 235). 
When the evidence is properly marshaled, it establishes that the medical examiner 
never called Daniel's injury unique or unusual (R201: 92-111). The doctor testified that the 
femoral artery runs through the leg and has two branches. When defendant stabbed Daniel, 
the blade went 3 V? inches into the thigh and partially severed one of those branches (R201: 
100-02). Once an artery is cut, whether partially or completely, it will bleed (R201:102-03). 
But with a partial cut, a more acute loss of blood results (R201:102). Without intervention, 
the bleeding will continue until death results (R201: 102-11). And though death is not 
12Even if Officer Burnham's preliminary hearing testimony constituted trial 
evidence, as defendant suggests, it does not support defendant's assertions. In the 
preliminary hearing, Burnham testified that he was unsure of the precise location of 
Daniel's wound, but after he saw blood squirt out, told Daniel's brother to press down on 
the spot until the EMTs arrived. Burnham explained that when he said this, he could hear 
the EMTs' sirens approaching (R200: 45-46, 49-50). 
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immediate, without intervention, it will result within minutes (id). Moreover, if the initial 
loss of blood is acute, even medical intervention may not prevent death (id.). 
Similarly, defendant asserts that the medical examiner "testified that the lack of 
medical help from the time between when 911 was called until medical help arrived . . . 
'would certainly have contributed to the deterioration in a person's condition'" and that "if 
Daniel had received first aid it would have 'retarded the progression of his demise.'" 
Br.Aplt. at 21. This does not fairly represent the substance of the doctor's testimony. As 
previously explained, the marshaled evidence does not establish how much time elapsed 
between the stabbing and the arrival of the officers at Daniel's mother's home; all that is 
known is that two minutes after the police arrived, the EMTs arrived. See supra at 23-24. 
The evidence establishes that before the police and EMTs arrived, Daniel had already lost 
large amounts of blood—there was a pool of blood one-fourth to one-half inch thick on the 
car floor, more on the car seat, and still more on the grass. See Statement of Facts at 6-7. 
The medical examiner was not asked about the actual two minute delay between the 
arrival of the police and the arrival of the EMTs. He was instead asked about hypothetical 
delays of six minutes, 13 minutes, and 19 minutes—presumptively representing counsel's 
speculation of the time gap between the stabbing and EMTs' arrival (R201:105 & 110). The 
doctor responded that any delay in receiving medical attention would hypothetically impact 
the person's chance of survival "ifno pressure, tourniquet, and other methodologies of trying 
to slow down the bleeding had been applied" (R201: 105-06) (emphasis added). But, the 
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doctor explained, the key factor affecting the irreversibility of the damage is the rate of the 
blood loss. If the initial blood loss is acute, chances of survival—even with medical 
treatment—are diminished (R201: 109-11). If the loss is slow and extends over time, the 
person "may be able to survive" (R201: 109) (emphasis added). In this case, the blood loss 
expected would be more copious, because the artery was partially severed, than if the artery 
had been completely cut (R201: 102-03). 
In sum, the marshaled evidence establishes that defendant fled eight blocks to safety 
of his mother's house after being stabbed. At some point, Daniel's brother rendered some 
first aid. The police did not render first aid because when they arrived, the EMTs were 
already en route and arrived two minutes later. But by that point, Daniel had loss so much 
blood that even medical intervention could not save him. These facts do not support 
defendant's claim that Daniel likely would have lived, but for the officer's decision to wait 
two minutes for the EMTs. 
Defendant also does not set forth the trial court's full findings, in contravention of the 
marshaling standard and rule 24(a)(l 1 (C), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. He attaches 
no copy of the closing arguments, during which the trial court discussed its views of the 
evidence, and attaches no copy of the trial court's oral findings. Instead, defendant states 
only that the trial court found that defendant recklessly stabbed Daniel. See Br.Aplt. at 9-10. 
As will be discussed in the next section, the court's findings go beyond this. Moreover, 
contrary to defendant's assertion, see Br.Aplt. at 10, the trial court did not refuse defense 
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counsel's request to state what lesser included offenses it considered. On the contrary, 
counsel withdrew this request once defendant was convicted only of a lesser included offense 
(R201: 261 & 265-66). 
(B) The Merits of Defendant's Sufficiency Challenge Should Not Be 
Considered Because He Failed to Preserve His Claims or Invited the 
Errors He Alleges. 
The merits of defendant's sufficiency challenge also should not be considered 
because, in large part, he failed to preserve the arguments he now raises. Morever, defense 
counsel's concessions and omissions below invited the errors he alleges on appeal. 
"Generally, in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue," Pratt 
v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f^ 15 (citation and quotation marks omitted). "[T]he preservation 
requirement is based on the premise that, in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court 
ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." 
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Consequently, "a party may not claim to have 
preserved an issue for appeal by merely mentioning an issue without introducing supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. (ellipses omitted). 
Closely tied to the preservation rule is the invited error doctrine, which precludes a 
party from claiming error "when that party led the trial court into committing the error." Id. 
at \ 17 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The doctrine recognizes that a party is "not 
entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal." 
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Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). It is "designed to inhibit a defendant from 
foregoing an objection with the strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal 
and then, if that strategy fails, claiming on appeal that the court should reverse." Id. at n. 18 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). 
As will be more folly discussed, defendant not only failed in large part to preserve his 
arguments on appeal, but he also invited the errors he now alleges. 
Defense counsel admitted in closing that the State's evidence, if believed, was 
sufficient to establish murder. See discussion, infra. In other words, he admitted that there 
was no legal bar to a finding of murder or any lesser included offense of murder, if the trial 
court believed the State's evidence. But the invitation to find murder was conditioned upon 
the trial court believing the State's evidence—and defense counsel argued that the evidence 
was not worthy of belief. Moreover, counsel argued that even if the evidence was believed 
and murder found, murder should be reduced to the lesser offense of manslaughter under an 
extreme emotional distress theory. And when the prosecutor requested consideration of a 
different theory of manslaughter—reckless manslaughter—defense counsel did not object. 
Neither of the parties asked the trial court to consider the lesser offense of negligent 
homicide, which required a factual basis to believe that defendant was unaware of the risk 
attendant in stabbing a person with a knife. In sum, defense counsel told the trial court that, 
if it believed the evidence, there was no legal bar to a finding of murder or manslaughter. 
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The trial court found the State's evidence credible and convicted defendant of reckless 
manslaughter. 
On appeal, defendant no longer claims that the State's evidence is not believable. Nor 
does he claim that the trial court erred in crediting it. Instead, he claims that even when the 
State's evidence is believed, it is insufficient to establish reckless manslaughter. See Br.Aplt 
at 18-25. He also now claims that a factual basis exists to support negligent homicide, i.e., 
that he was unaware of the risk of death. See id. As will be discussed, infra, the preservation 
rule and the invited error doctrine preclude consideration of these claims. The significance 
of defendant's concessions and omissions becomes apparent in the context of the offenses 
charged and considered. 
Murder 
Defendant was charged with murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004) (R. 1-2). He was not charged with the first variant of murder, 
i.e., that he intentionally and knowingly killed Daniel. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(a) 
(Add. A). Nevertheless, in rendering its verdict, the trial court found that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that defendant intended Daniel's death (R201: 265) (Add. B). That 
finding is not at issue. 
Defendant was charged with the second and third variants of murder (R. 1-2). 
The second variant of murder is established when a defendant, "intending to cause 
serious bodily injury to another , . . commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that 
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causes the death of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(b) (Add A). "'Serious bodily 
injury' means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted 
loss or impairment of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death" 
See Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(10) (West 2004) (emphasis added) (Add A). An act clearly 
dangerous to life is one that creates a "a very high risk of death." State v. Standiford, 769 
P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 1988). Thus, to be guilty of the second variant of murder, a defendant 
must intend to create a substantial risk of death and knowingly engage in conduct that creates 
a very high risk of death. Id. Here, the trial court found the evidence insufficient to establish 
the objective risk element, i.e., that stabbing a person in the thigh creates a very high risk of 
death (R201: 254). The court did not find insufficient evidence of defendant's intent to do 
serious bodily injury (id.). 
The third variant of murder is established when a defendant, "acting under 
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life . . . engages in conduct that 
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another." See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(c) (Add. A). To be guilty of the third variant of murder, a 
defendant must knowingly and with "utter callousness and indifference to human life" create 
a risk that has a "highly likely probability" of causing death. See Standiford, 769 P.2d at 
261-62 & 264. Here, the trial court found the evidence insufficient to establish defendant's 
subjective callousness or the requisite objective risk (R201: 265). 
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At trial, defense counsel's argument against murder was two-pronged. First, he 
argued that the trial court should not credit either his confession or Chelsea's testimony and 
that, without this evidence, there was no proof that he stabbed Daniel (R201:225-32 & 23 8). 
See Addendum C (Closing Arguments). The trial court rej ected this argument when it found 
the confession truthful and Chelsea's account credible (R201:263-64) (Add. B). On appeal, 
defendant does not attack these findings or otherwise contest that he stabbed Daniel. 
Defense counsel made an alternative argument against murder. He admitted that, if 
the State's evidence was believed, it was legally sufficient to establish murder (R201: 224-
25) (Add. C). But he argued that any finding of murder should be reduced to second-degree 
felony manslaughter (R201: 237-38). 
Manslaughter 
Defense counsel explained that murder should be reduced to manslaughter if the court 
found, in addition to the element of murder, that defendant stabbed Daniel while acting under 
the effect of extreme emotional distress (R201:237-38) (Add. C). "A person suffers extreme 
emotional distress when exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress such that the 
average reasonable person would react by experiencing a loss of self-control." State v. 
Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 14, 116 P.3d 985 (citations omitted and quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant argued that any doubt as to whether extreme emotional distress existed must be 
resolved in defendant's favor (id.). 
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Extreme emotional distress manslaughter demands a predicate finding of murder. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1 )(b) (recognizing that this variant of manslaughter occurs when 
a defendant "commits a homicide that would be murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant 
to Subsection 76-5-203(4)" of the murder statute) (emphasis added). Subsection 203(4), in 
turn, recognizes that it is "an affirmative defense to a charge of murder... that the defendant 
caused the death of another . . . under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which 
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse;" but the distress "substantially caused by the 
defendant's own conduct" is excluded from justifiable distress. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203(4)(a)(i) & -(b)(ii) {Add A). 
The prosecutor claimed there was not sufficient evidence to support the defense and 
objected to the court considering a reduction to manslaughter under this theory (R201:219) 
(Add. C). See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, \ 19 (recognizing that while a defendant need not use 
particular language or key words to raise the defense of extreme emotional distress, there 
must be a "rational basis for a verdict on the lesser included offense" of manslaughter). 
The prosecutor agreed, however, that manslaughter could appropriately be considered 
as a lesser offense alternative under the theory that defendant recklessly caused Daniel's 
death (id.). Reckless manslaughter requires that the defendant be aware of, but consciously 
disregard, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from his actions. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-205(1) & 76-2-103(3) (West 2004) (Add A). See also State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1214 (Utah 1993). 
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Defense counsel did not argue that the facts would not support a finding of reckless 
manslaughter or otherwise obj ect to a finding of reckless manslaughter (R201:224-3 8) (Add 
Q. Indeed, when the defense counsel subsequently listed the lesser included offenses it 
wanted considered, he stated, "manslaughter," without differentiating between the two 
supporting theories (R201: 246). Ultimately, the trial court accepted the parties' invitation 
to consider the lesser included offense of manslaughter and found defendant guilty of 
manslaughter under the reckless theory (R201: 265) (Add. B). 
Defendant now claims, for the first time, that the trial court clearly erred in finding 
manslaughter. His concessions and omissions below bar consideration of the claim. 
When defendant admitted that the State's evidence, if believed, was legally sufficient 
to establish murder, he conceded that the evidence was sufficient to find the subjective intent 
element of murder, i.e., that defendant intended to create a high risk of death or knowingly 
created a highly likely probability of death. See murder discussion, supra at 29-30. 
Establishment of an intentional or knowing mental state necessarily establishes a reckless 
mental state. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-104(2) (West 2004) (recognizing that a lower 
mental state is proved by establishment of a higher mental state) (Add. A), See also Dunn, 
850 P.2d at 1212. Thus, by conceding that the evidence, if believed, was legally sufficient 
to establish murder's intentional or knowing mental state, defense counsel necessarily agreed 
that the evidence was also legally sufficient to establish manslaughter's reckless mental state. 
Consequently, any error in finding reckless manslaughter was invited. Defendant cannot now 
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argue that the evidence is insufficient to establish a reckless intent, i.e., that defendant was 
subjectively aware of, but consciously disregarded a substantial risk of death. See Pratt, 
2007 UT 41, If 17 & 18. 
Similarly, wThen defense counsel admitted that the evidence, if believed, established 
murder, he conceded that the evidence was legally sufficient to prove the existence of 
murder's objective risk element, i.e., that objectively a very high risk or highly likely 
probability of death existed. See murder discussion, supra at 29-30. A very high or highly 
likely risk of death is greater than a substantial risk of death, the objective risk element of 
manslaughter. Standiford, 769 P.2d at 265-66. Consequently, by admitting that the 
evidence, if believed, was sufficient to establish the objective risk element of murder, 
defendant necessarily admitted that the evidence, if believed, was also sufficient to establish 
the lower objective risk element of manslaughter. Again, whether viewed as waiver or 
invited error, defendant is now precluded from arguing that the evidence does not establish 
the existence of a substantial risk of death.13 See Pratt, 2007 UT 41, ^ 17 & 18. 
Negligent Homicide: Defendant also waived consideration of his subjective intent 
claim when he failed to ask the trial court to consider negligent homicide. 
13Defendant also asked the court to consider third-degree felony homicide by 
assault, which applies only "under circumstances not amounting to . . . murder or 
manslaughter:' Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-209 (West 2004) (emphasis added) {Add A). The 
trial court's manslaughter finding precluded consideration of this lesser offense. On 
appeal, defendant does not argue that the evidence establishes homicide by assault. 
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As discussed, supra, at 32, reckless manslaughter requires proof that defendant was 
aware of a substantial risk of death. Negligent homicide, a misdemeanor, also requires proof 
of a substantial risk of death, but does not require any awareness of the risk. See State v. 
Boss, 2005 UT App 520, % 14 n.2,127 P.2d 1236; State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Utah 
App. 1991). Negligent homicide requires proof only that defendant "ought to be aware of 
a substantial risk of death." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (West 2004) & 176-2-103(4) 
(Add. A). See also State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142,148 (Utah 1983) (recognizing that negligent 
homicide is generally viewed as a lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter). 
The prosecutor argued in closing that negligent homicide was not an appropriate lesser 
include offense to consider because there was no factual basis to find that defendant was 
unaware of the risk of death (R201: 217-18). Stee State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah 
App. 1991) (holding that consideration of negligent homicide was not appropriate where the 
defendant admitted that she stabbed the victim with a knife), cert denied, 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1992); State v. Howard, 597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979) (recognizing that where the 
defendant presents no evidence to support that he was unaware of the risk of death, an 
instruction on negligent homicide was not justified). When defense counsel responded in 
closing, he did not dispute this (R201: 225-38) (Add. Q . Nor did defense counsel otherwise 
ask the court to consider the lesser offense of negligent homicide (R201: 246). 
Now, for the first time on appeal, defendant claims that the facts only establish that 
he was unaware of a substantial risk of death (negligent homicide), and are insufficient to 
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establish that he was aware of the risk of death (manslaughter). See Br.Aplt. at 14-17. 
Defendant is precluded from making this argument when he not only failed to make it below, 
but led the trial court to believe that there was no factual basis to support it. 
In sum, defendant's trial concession that the evidence, if believed, was sufficient to 
establish murder precludes his appellate claim that the evidence, if believed, is insufficient 
to establish the lesser offense of manslaughter. Similarly, defendant's failure at trial to claim 
there was a factual basis to find that he was unaware of the risk of death (negligent homicide) 
precludes his appellate claim that the facts establish that he was unaware of the risk. 
(C) Even if the Merits of the Sufficiency Challenge Are Considered, the 
Clear Weight of the Evidence Supports the Trial Courfs Finding that 
Defendant Was Aware of But Consciously Disregarded, a Substantial 
Risk of Death Wlten He Stabbed Daniel. 
Even if this Court reaches defendant's sufficiency claim, the claim lacks merit. The 
clear weight of the marshaled evidence supports the trial court's finding that when defendant 
stabbed Daniel, defendant was aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial risk that 
death would result. See standard of review discussion at 19-20. 
The State previously set forth the marshaled evidence. See Statement of Facts at 3-15 
& discussion at 20-26. The following summary discusses the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the marshaled evidence and in support of the finding and verdict. 
Defendant did not shy away from fights. But he usually limited himself to fist-fights 
because he knew that using a knife or gun in a fight created a risk of death. In fact, he 
believed that if someone used a knife in a fight, the person intended to kill. These facts and 
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inferences establish defendant's awareness of the substantial risk of death attendant in 
stabbing a person. See Day, 815 P.2d at 1349 (intentionally pointing a gun at a person 
establishes awareness of the risk sufficient for reckless manslaughter); State v. Wessendorf, 
111 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah App.) (holding that defendant's own caution in dealing with 
rattlesnake established subjective awareness of the risk an unrestrained snake created), cert 
denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989); State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674,676 (Utah 1982) (holding 
that Bindrup's own admission that he ran at least two other red lights established that he was 
aware of the risks sufficient to find reckless manslaughter). See also State v. Robinson, 
2003 UT App 1, f 10 n.3, 63 P.3d 105 (holding that an inadvertent pointing of gun did not 
establish intent for manslaughter, but recognizing that purposeful aiming of gun would be 
sufficient to establish reckless intent). 
Daniel, on the other hand, did not like to fight. He fled as soon as the Islanders 
invaded the Windsor apartment. And even when he realized he had dropped his telephone 
in the driveway, he did not go back towards the apartment where the fight was, but sent 
Chelsea back to look for it. Nevertheless, as he sat in his car waiting for Chelsea to return, 
defendant assaulted him. 
Chelsea did not hear Daniel say anything to provoke the fight, though defendant told 
the police that Daniel said "something." In any case, defendant admitted that his adrenaline 
was pumped from the fight with the Islanders and that he readily opened the car door and 
punched Daniel rather than simply walking away. The fist fight ended a minute later when 
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defendant knowingly plunged a knife into Daniel's thigh as the unarmed Daniel sat in his car. 
The knife blade went fully into the thigh, some 3 lA inches, and hit one of two "significant" 
branches of the femoral artery. Daniel immediately began losing blood. 
Daniel fled to the safety of his mother's home eight blocks away. During his flight, 
he lost a significant amount of blood—enough that there was an one-fourth or one-half inch 
pool of blood on the floor of the car and more on the car's seat. Apparently, the blood loss 
was already affecting Daniel because he hit the side of his mother's house as he drove into 
her driveway. He fell or was pulled from the car and laid on the lawn, where he continued 
to bleed. His brother attempted first aid. The police and EMTs were dispatched to the house 
at 5:07 a.m. Two minutes after the police arrived, the EMTs arrived. The EMTs 
immediately provided medical treatment. Five minutes later, they transported Daniel to the 
hospital, where he received more medical treatment. But Daniel's blood loss was too acute 
and he died. 
These facts, together with the medical examiner's testimony, see Statement of Facts 
at 7-9, establish that a substantial risk of death existed here. Contrary to defendant's claim, 
see BrAplt. at 22, it is not necessary for the State to prove that defendant knew of the exact 
location of the artery, but only that an artery if punctured could cause a person to bleed to 
death. See State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing that proof 
of recklessness does not require a specific knowledge of the premise location of the victims 
when shot, but only an awareness of their presence in the house that was his target). And 
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while it is true, as defendant contends, see Br.Aplt. at 23, that stabbing a thigh may not be 
as risky as stabbing a heart, the fact that a heart carries an extreme risk of death does not 
mean that stabbing a thigh does not carry a substantial risk of death. The likelihood of harm 
is but one factor in determining the degree of risk; the other is the magnitude of the harm: 
A risk may be substantial even if the chance the harm will occur is well below 
fifty percent. Some risks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree 
of probability because the magnitude of the harm is potentially great. For 
example, if a person holds a revolver with a single bullet in one of the 
chambers, points the gun at another's head and pulls the trigger, then the risk 
is substantial even though the odds that death will result are no better than one 
in six. 
Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Substantive Criminal Law § 5.4(f) (2d ed. 2007). Consequently, "[a] 
risk does not have to be 'more likely than not to occur9 or 'probable' in order to be 
substantial." Id. See also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 263 n.9 (recognizing that "some 
likelihood that death will occur" may create a substantial risk of death). 
Defendant also asserts that defendant's culpability for Daniel's death should be lessen 
because first aid was—he claims—unreasonably delayed. See Br.Aplt. at 20-22. As 
previously discussed, supra at 22-23, the marshaled facts do not support this. But even if it 
were established that first aid was unreasonably delayed, that fact would not mitigate 
defendant's culpability. See Wessendorf, 111 P.2d at 526 (recognizing that "intervening 
medical error is not a defense where the defendant has inflicted a mortal wound upon 
another"). 
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It is well established that "the linchpin of causation is whether the superseding party's 
acts were reasonably foreseeable." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1215. 
An intervening, inde pendent agency will not exonerate the accused for 
criminal liability from a victim's death unless the death is solely attributable 
to the secondary agency, and not at all induced by the primary one. To qualify 
as an intervening cause an event must be unforeseeable and one in which the 
accused does not participate; an intervening cause must be so extraordinary 
that it is unfair to hold the accused responsible for the death. 
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, defendant does not claim that Daniel's 
death is "solely attributable" to a delay in receiving first aid. Instead, he merely claims only 
that it contributed to Daniel's demise. See BrAplt. at 22 & 24. 
Moreover, a delay in receiving first aid was foreseeable. Defendant stabbed Daniel 
in a car in the street. Even assuming that a 16 minute delay followed, as claimed by 
defendant, see Br.Aplt. at 18 & 20, such a delay is not "so extraordinary" that it is unfair to 
hold defendant responsible for causing Daniel's death, especially where, as here, the delay 
was caused by Daniel fleeing to the safety of his mother's home and the EMTs responding. 
And though defendant chides Chelsea for not notifying the police of Daniel's injury when 
they first interviewed her, defendant likewise did not tell the police that Daniel was injured 
when he allegedly spoke to them immediately after stabbing Daniel. 
In sum, defendant placed Daniel in peril by stabbing him and, therefore, must bear the 
burden of the natural sequence of events that followed. See State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335, 
339 (Utah 1980); Boss, 2005 UT App 520, \ 23 (both recognizing that causation is 
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established when "a party by his wrongful conduct creates a condition of peril" that in "the 
natural sequence of events" results in injury). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's manslaughter 
conviction. 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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§ 7 6 - 1 - 6 0 1 . Definitions 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a 
criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim 
to reasonably believe the item is likely to c&use death or serious bodily 
injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner 
that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and 
the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, govern-
ment, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion 
or control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function 
of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to seri-
ous bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary 
disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, 
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of recording informa-
tion or fixing information in a form capable of being preserved. 
§ 7 6 - 2 - 1 0 3 , Definitions 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circum-
stances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circum-
stances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
§ 7 6 - 2 - 1 0 4 . Culpable mental state—Higher mental states included 
(1) If acting with criminal negligence is sufficient to establish the culpable 
mental state for an element of an offense, that element is also established if a 
person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. 
(2) If acting recklessly is sufficient to establish the culpable mental state for 
an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts 
intentionally or knowingly. 
(3) If acting knowingly is sufficient to establish the culpable mental state for 
an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts 
intentionally. 
§ 76-5-203. Murder 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab 
Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is 
younger than 18 years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under 
Section 76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(/) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits 
an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to hu-
man life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any 
predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed 
in the course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate 
flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate 
offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the 
predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the 
commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under 
Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the 
offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is estab-
lished under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder 
that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death 
of another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 
76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection 
(4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall 
be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then 
existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 5 . Manslaughter 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; 
(b) commits a homicide which would be murder, but the offense is reduced 
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-203(4); or 
(c) commits murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 
76-5-205.5. 
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 6 . Negligent homicide 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, acting with 
criminal negligence, causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
§ 76-5—209. Homicide by assault—Penalty 
(1) A person commits homicide by assault if, under circumstances not 
amounting to aggravated murder, murder, or manslaughter, a person causes 
the death of another while intentionally or knowingly attempting, with unlawful 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another. 
(2) Homicide by assault is a third degree felony. 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 52. FINDINGS BY THE COURT 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts .without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
5 8A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the^ findings of fact, and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action* Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not bevset aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered"as the findings of tfie^  court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. TKe trial pourt need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings 
and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such 
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or 
a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
Aaaendu 
May 10, 2006 9:58 AM 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: All right, this is the matter of the 
State vs. Alejandro Carrillo and Raul Carrillo, case 
Nos. 041906193 and 194. Counsel, will you enter your 
appearances for the record again, please. 
MR. HALL: Jeff Hall and Clark Harms for the State. 
MS. GEORGE: Julie George on behalf of Alejandro 
Carrillo, who is here with me in court. 
MR. HEINEMAN: Rob Heineman and Marie Maxwell on 
behalf of Raul Carrillo. 
THE COURT: Is there anything either of the parties 
want to place on the record before I proceed to issue my 
decision? 
MR. HALL: Only if the Court has any questions. 
THE COURT: I have no questions. 
Mr. Heineman? 
MR. HEINEMAN: I would like the Court to place on the 
record the lesser-included offenses that the Court considered, 
and also a ruling as to whether it is the State's burden to 
disprove extreme emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
THE COURT: Ms. George? 
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MS. GEORGE: Nothing on my half. 
THE COURT: Mr. Heineman, I am going to decline your 
invitation. I don!t think it is necessary. We had this 
discussion — 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, forgive the interruption. 
Before we get too far down the road, I make the observation, 
because they arenTt there, although they were present when the 
Court informed them we would reconvene this matter at ten — 
THE COURT: Would you like me to wait for awhile? 
Thatfs fine, I will wait for a few minutes. 
MR. HALL: I apologize. 
THE COURT: No, I appreciate you bringing that to my 
attention. 
(A pause in the proceedings.) 
THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 
MR. HALL: The victim's family is now present, and we 
appreciate the Court's indulgence. I think we are ready to 
proceed. 
THE COURT: Let me begin by saying how much I 
appreciate the lawyers1 efforts in this case. This case was 
marked by an extreme degree of professionalism and was 
extraordinarily well tried and succinctly tried. I greatly 
appreciate that. 
Also, and obviously, I want the parties to know that 
I in making the following findings I employed the reasonable 
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doubt standard. I think that goes without saying; 
nevertheless, I said it. 
Now, having heard and considered all of the evidence 
and the arguments of counsel, the Court rules as follows: On 
September 17, 2004, Daniel Johnson, the victim in this matter, 
and Chelsea Stout participated in a party in an apartment off 
of Windsor Circle, which is located at approximately 800 East 
and 2700 South in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The 
defendants, the brothers Raul and Alejandro Carrillo, were 
among others who also attended the party. 
The party continued into the early hours of 
September 18. It ended rather abruptly when a group of males, 
primarily of Pacific island descent, tried to push their way 
into the dwelling. In the process the intruders demanded to 
know if the party participants were Tongans. It would not be 
the last time that evening that the defendant Raul Carrillo 
would be taken for a Polynesian. 
After the intrusion a melee broke out between the 
intruders and the others. As the fight participants were 
scattering, Raul Carrillo found himself in the street, in front 
of the apartment, close to Daniel Johnson!s car. Mr. Johnson 
was seated in the driver's seat of his car. Why Raul Carrillo 
approached Mr. Johnson, we may never truly know. Mr. Carrillo 
himself claims it was because they exchanged words. 
What is known and beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
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Raul Carrillo, as he himself confessed, took a knife and stuck 
it one time, just one time, into Daniel Johnson's left thigh at 
a spot about 5 inches above the knee. A word about the 
confession. The Court has reviewed it and rereviewed it and 
then reviewed portions of it again, each time becoming more 
convinced of the truthfulness of Raul Carrillofs ultimate 
confession. 
The confession, however, does not stand alone. There 
is also the eyewitness account of Chelsea Stout. Now, to say 
that Ms. StoutTs testimony has problems would be a large 
understatement. Nevertheless, it is not without some force as 
to the actual act of stabbing and the identity of the stabber, 
subjects on which she remained relatively consistent. 
In any event, Raul Carrillo stabbed Mr. Johnson with 
a blade that was approximately 1 centimeter wide at its widest 
point, and 8.5 inches long — or, rather, 3.5 inches. The stab 
wound partially transected a significant branch of 
Mr. Johnson's femoral artery, and caused Mr. Johnson to bleed 
to death. The death occurred in Salt Lake County. 
The evidence does not support a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt, as the State maintains, that Defendant 
Alejandro Carrillo gave his brother the knife or that he 
intended for his brother to use it to attack Mr. Johnson. As 
an aside here, having reviewed and rereviewed the confession, 
it does not in any way, shape or form corroborate the StateTs 
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position on this point. Therefore, the Court finds the 
defendant Alejandro Carrillo not guilty of murder in the first 
degree. 
As to Defendant Raul Carrillo, the Court does not 
find that the evidence supports a determination beyond a 
reasonable doubt that, A, he intentionally or knowingly caused 
the death of Daniel Johnson; B, that he committed an act 
clearly dangerous to human life; or, C, that he engaged in 
conduct that created a grave risk of death while acting under 
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life. 
Therefore, the Court also finds the defendant Raul Carrillo not 
guilty of murder in the first degree. 
However, the Court does find the defendant Raul 
Carrillo acted recklessly, as that term is defined by the Utah 
criminal code, and that he recklessly caused the death of 
Daniel Johnson. Therefore, the Court finds the defendant Raul 
Carrillo guilty of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, 
a second-degree felony, 
Mr. Hall, I am going to ask you provide written 
findings and conclusions that are consistent with the CourtTs 
oral ruling. We are adjourned. 
Let's have the defendant Raul Carrillo and his 
counsel brought back out. Before I proceed, let me note the 
defendant Raul Carrillo is present along with counsel. 
Mr. Heineman, I decline your invitation. 
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MR. HEINEMAN: I withdraw that request. 
THE COURT: Raul Roberto Carrillo, having been found 
guilty of manslaughter, a second-degree felony, we need to 
proceed to sentence you in this particular matter. I am going 
to ask AP&P prepare an updated and new presentence report in 
connection with the matter. Counsel, do you waive the maximum 
time for sentencing? 
MR. HEINEMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: You have the right to be sentenced in not 
fewer than two days or more than 45 days. Do you agree with 
your counsel's waiver of the right to be sentenced in not less 
than 45 days? 
MR. HEINEMAN: He wants to take a little bit more 
than 45 days to have a presentence report prepared. Are you 
okay with that? 
THE DEFENDANT RAUL CARRILLO: Yes. 
THE COURT: AP&P will receive the referral, prepare a 
presentence report. We will set sentencing for . . . 
THE CLERK: June 30. 
THE COURT: June 30 at 9:00 a.m. All right, we are 
adjourned. 
(These proceedings were concluded.) 
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Addendum C 
Q Thatfs what she testified to under oath here 
yesterday, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And then she said, I saw Raul with a knife, correct? 
A Yes. 
MS. GEORGE: No further questions, your Honor. 
MR. HEINEMAN: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. 
Call your next witness. 
MS. GEORGE: Your Honor, on behalf of Alejandro 
Carrillo, we have no other witnesses. We rest. 
THE COURT: Mr. Heineman? 
MR. HEINEMAN: Raul Carrillo would rest as well. 
THE COURT: Rebuttal? 
MR. HALL: There is no rebuttal, your Honor. The 
State rests. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, we will proceed to closing. 
Do you want to talk about -- you have this concept of 
instructions in mind which is an unfamiliar one to me in a 
bench trial, frankly, Ms. George. 
MS. GEORGE: Do you want a full set or do you want us 
to just argue what we believe the law is? 
THE COURT: I want you to argue what the law is. 
Instructions are unnecessary. 
MR. HALL: I was tempted to read all the jury 
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instructions to the Court as part of my closing argument. 
THE COURT: I think that?s an excellent idea. Why 
donTt you get even with me for all the years I have tortured 
people. I want you to do it with some zest. If you want me to 
have them and consider them, I will certainly do that. That 
has not been my practice nor experience nor do I think it is in 
any way required. They exist to provide jurors with an 
indication of what the law is. You can certainly argue those 
points to me. 
MR. HALL: Very well, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you prepared to close? 
MR. HALL: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Please proceed. 
MR. HALL: Thank you, your Honor. May it please the 
Court, in some ways, your Honor, this is a straightforward 
case. And I begin as Mr. Harms began, what brings us here is 
Daniel Johnson, who is no longer with us, at the hands of the 
defendants, who are before you today, who entered the courtroom 
with a presumption of innocence until such time as the State 
has proved their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. And now that 
the State has adduced evidence to prove their guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it now becomes my duty, my responsibility and 
my privilege to state to the Court the summary of the evidence 
and what it means. 



























by a mentor of mine who used to sit on the Third District Court 
bench, to invite any questions from the Court first. 
THE COURT: I was going to ask if counsel minded if I 
asked any questions during the closing. 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, that would be helpful, because 
I don't want the Court to wonder about "X" and for me to stand 
up here and argue about "Y." Please don't mistake it for any 
lack of general remarks that I would hope the Court would allow 
me to make at an appropriate time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Heineman? 
MR. HEINEMAN: No objection, Judge. 
THE COURT: I'm not looking for an objection versus 
just a preference. I have frequently, as you know, 
participated by asking questions, and wonder what your 
preference is. I have also had lawyers tell me they prefer to 
make a traditional closing, and sit here and not ask questions. 
MR. HEINEMAN: I try not to be that rigid, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: The other thing I would caution everyone 
is if I do ask any questions, not to take anything away from 
them, no indication of a suggestion of what I am thinking. 
Sometimes we ask questions just to play the devil's advocate. 
So you never know. Go right ahead. 
MR. HALL: Thank you, your Honor. I would like to 
address my argument, my remarks, in two phases. And whereas 
sometimes the State!s rebuttal argument comes after the 
Defense's closing, in light of the Court as the trier of fact, 
if the Court will allow me a little leeway to proceed with an 
argument that I hope characterizes the evidence and places it 
into context so that the Court clearly understands the State!s 
position. 
I am not a civil lawyer, I haven?t had any experience 
with it, but I know a little bit about it, and I know in many 
trials, many civil actions there is a bifurcation between 
liability and damages. I would like to maybe focus my remarks 
with that bifurcation in mind, and I will begin by discussing 
maybe the facts of the case and what tends to prove liability 
or guilt to begin with, and some of my remarks later on I think 
I would like to address what that means, what impact those 
facts have on the law. 
We have heard and the Court has patiently and 
attentively listened to the testimony of witnesses who 
described an unfortunate event, but one that was criminal, 
unavoidable, but one for which there must be accountability and 
justice. 
Daniel Johnson went to a party with Chelsea Stout 
without any idea that it would be essentially the last thing he 
ever did. I think that the defendants were at that party 
without ever thinking that they would be responsible for the 
death of Daniel Johnson. The State has never argued that it 
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was the desire or the hope of these defendants to kill Daniel 
Johnson. As the Court knows, that's not required for a 
conviction of murder in the State laws of Utah. I will address 
that in more detail later. 
What I think is important to understand is that there 
is uncontroverted evidence to a couple of very important, 
salient points. We can discuss whether Chelsea Stout described 
the clothing, the shorts or the sweats and described whether 
Chelsea had women with her or not. We can argue or debate 
about the details of whether or not someone was accurately 
testifying to all the particular details. The Court will 
observe that these events happened nearly two years ago. The 
preliminary hearing was almost a year and a half ago. 
I think Chelsea's testimony, while coming from an 
unsophisticated victim witness, and with blemishes and all, was 
very telling on a couple of critical points, and that is what 
she saw that night. She saw the defendant Alejandro Carrillo 
hand something to the defendant Raul Carrillo, and immediately 
it was open and it was a knife. And I think there is no 
question beyond a reasonable doubt what Alejandro had and 
handed to Raul. It was a knife. And immediately thereafter 
Raul plunged that knife 8.5 centimeters into the flesh of 
Daniel Johnson, thereby creating a wound from which he bled to 
death. 
Now, 8.5 centimeters is something that the Court can 
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determine. I measured 8.5 centimeters. It is not an exhibit 
that I intend to mark. It is purely demonstrative. The Court 
can measure it. Counsel can measure it if they want. 
THE COURT: I have measured it. I have it. 
MR. HALL: And that, your Honor, is 8.5 centimeters 
long. It is the length of the wound created by Raul Carrillo 
when he plunged that knife into the flesh of Daniel Johnson. 
The liability in the case is clear. These two did 
it. And there is uncontroverted evidence that on that night 
these two defendants were responsible for handing the knife to 
the stabber and the stabber killing Daniel Johnson. 
What that means is what I would like to address in my 
rebuttal argument, and how the law is applied to those facts is 
what I intend to conclude with at the end of my remarks. So I 
will invite any questions from the Court up to this point. 
Otherwise, I will reserve the remainder of my remarks for my 
rebuttal. 
MR. HEINEMAN: Judge, I am going to object. Rebuttal 
is supposed to be for rebuttal. If the Prosecution has legal 
argument, they should be making that argument in their argument 
in chief. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hall, I think if you want — as I see 
it, you want to argue the penalty, whether it constitutes 
murder or any other offense? 
MR. HALL: Yes, your Honor. I would be happy to do 
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that now. 
THE COURT: I think you should address it now. I 
will sustain the objection. But let's talk about the liability 
phase for just a second. What do you do, what do you say to 
the undisputed statement that, essentially, is a dying 
declaration the victim in this case identified another 
perpetrator? 
MR. HALL: Ifm not sure that he did identify another 
perpetrator. He didnft identify the names of anyone. What he 
identified was a description of a person that stabbed him. The 
way he identified him was as Polynesian. I think that would 
raise some reasonable doubt if somebody from a drastically 
different-looking ethnic background or maybe gender were 
described. 
But the Court has to remember the condition of Daniel 
when he made the dying declaration. The Court has seen the 
amount of blood loss that occurred when he made that statement. 
The Court knows the circumstances under which he was on death's 
doorstep. So I think the Court can take a couple of things 
away from that. "A," I don't think the reliability is 
100 percent. And, certainly, we are not trying to suggest that 
he was misleading anyone. I think that in the state that he 
was in, to the extent that he could, he made a statement it was 
a Polynesian that stabbed him. 
THE COURT: It is a big Polynesian stabbed him. 
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MR. HALL: I don!t think that is widely divergent, 
given the state of the victim at the time, from the physical 
description of the person who stabbed him. And I certainly 
don!t think that rises to reasonable doubt that we ought to be 
looking for a Polynesian, especially when we take it into 
context with all the other evidence. 
THE COURT: They had spent the night together. They 
had been together for hours during that evening. And he does 
nothing. He doesn't use any names or any other indication. 
And the ME suggests, does he not, there is no reason to doubt 
the voracity of Mr. Johnson? The loss of blood, that 
responding to the question would not indicate a higher 
function, and that the loss of blood at the time, in the ME?s 
opinion, would not impact his ability to truthfully respond to 
that question. 
MR. HALL: Or, as I determine it, the higher function 
would be to create a deception, to know the truth and then 
fabricate something other than what he knows is the truth. 
THE COURT: You are certainly not suggesting that he 
did that, and neither is the Defense. 
MR. HALL: Right. 
THE COURT: What you are arguing is really kind of 
a — that the defendant Raul Carrillo can fit the description 
of a big Polynesian, period. 
MR. HALL: A bottom line like this, he was real 
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close, especially considering the state that he was in. 
That, coupled with Raul's admission, eventually, 
after being very deceptive to the police, eventually admitting 
that he was the stabber, I don't think this is a case of who 
done it. If we didn!t have that, if we didn!t have the other 
evidence of Chelsea seeing him do it, and the defendant 
admitting to the police that he did it, if we didnTt have that, 
your Honor, then I think I would agree with the Court that 
there is this possibility that maybe it was a Polynesian that 
stabbed him. But when we take it together with the totality of 
the evidence, the identity of the stabber is not the question 
that I think the Court needs to get its mind around at this 
point, with all due respect. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, the Court can consider 
lesser-included instructions as it SBOS fit. I think that the 
law instructs us that if you don't find the elements of the 
charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt you may consider some 
of the lesser-included. So while this is not the way I would 
necessarily approach the deliberation or the evaluation of the 
lesser includeds, I don't think there is anything to keep the 
Court from doing it, but I do it to illustrate the problems 
with the lesser-included offenses. 
I believe that at least one of the parties has asked 
the Court to consider the lesser-included offense, what they 
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suggest a lesser-included offense, of negligent homicide. 
There is no evidence here that anyone acted negligently when 
they caused the death of Daniel Johnson. There is no evidence 
of negligence. The failure to use due care. This wasn't an 
accident. This wasn?t a misstep on the part of the stabber. 
It was an intentional act. And I think there is no evidence 
before the Court that there was anything other than a 
deliberate, intentional act that certainly wasnft negligence. 
I think that the Court does not have evidence before it to 
warrant a consideration, even if it were arguably a lesser-
included offense, that would warrant the Court to consider that 
as a lesser-included offense. 
The next, least-severe lesser-included offense is the 
crime of homicide by assault. As the Court knows, that 
requires the Court to find in Salt Lake County, on or about 
September 18, the defendant caused the death of another while 
intentionally or knowingly attempting with unlawful force or 
violence to do bodily injury to another. ThatTs the definition 
of assault. The Court knows an assault is an act or an attempt 
to do bodily injury, and as the Court knows bodily injury is 
defined among other things as physical pain. 
The crime is not homicide by aggravated assault. The 
crime is homicide by assault. And when an assailant, a killer, 
uses a dangerous weapon -- and the Court can find that a knife 
is a dangerous weapon under the definition of dangerous 
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weapons — that when the defendant commits his crime by 
aggravated assault, there is not evidence before the Court that 
an assault was committed. It is not aggravated assault. And, 
furthermore, just from logically and jurisprudentially, if that 
were not so, then every homicide would have as its 
lesser-included offense homicide by assault. And we don!t see 
that. It is an unusual crime to convict someone of homicide by 
assault. It is not routine for us to argue in jury trials that 
there is a lesser-included of homicide by assault, because many 
of the homicides that we have involve the use of a weapon, 
which would be an aggravated assault. 
THE COURT: Where is the dangerous weapon definition? 
MR. HEINEMAN: 76-1-601, Judge. 
MR. HALL: Many of those definitions are in that 
chapter. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HALL: So once a dangerous weapon is used the 
crime is not assault, it is aggravated assault, and, therefore, 
a homicide by assault is not applicable in this case. It is 
not truly a lesser-included. 
I think the Court would appropriately consider the 
proper lesser-included offense here of manslaughter. As the 
Court knows, that is a situation in which the actor recklessly 
causes the death of another, or causes the death of another 
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which 
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there is a reasonable explanation. I don't believe there is 
any evidence before the Court of either an extreme emotional 
disturbance or a reasonable explanation. Or that he causes the 
death of another under circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a legal justification. 
There has been no evidence presented before the Court that 
either of these individuals either reasonably believed or in 
fact had a legal justification. So there is only one prong of 
the manslaughter that could apply, and that is recklessly 
causes the death of another. 
And the reason I believe that the Court ought to 
continue in its analysis upward in the severity of the crimes 
is as illustrated in the instruction here for murder. We 
conceded at the beginning, and it is I think telling from the 
preparation of this instruction, that we have omitted the first 
definition of murder, because we have never argued or believed 
or asserted that either of these defendants set out on the 17th 
or the 18th of September with the hope and desire of their 
heart to kill anyone. So we have left that element out of this 
instruction, in all candor to the Court. 
So Alejandro Carrillo, as a party to the offense, is 
yoked to the actions of his brother by handing him the 
instrument of Daniel Johnsonfs death. He as a party is weighed 
and judged along with Raul Carrillo's actions, and that's why I 
want to focus on what Raul did. 
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Raul commits murder by intending to cause serious 
bodily injury. Serious bodily injury, your Honor, is defined 
in the code, and I submit to you that 8.5-centimeter wound, 
gouge, hole in the flesh of Daniel Johnson constitutes serious 
bodily injury. If it were a glancing knife blow, I would have 
a different opinion. If it were a slash, I would reconsider. 
But he plunged the knife into Daniel Johnson!s leg and caused 
an 8.5-centimeter hole, gash. That's serious bodily injury. 
And there is no other intent that the Court can draw from that 
act other than intending to cause an 8.5-centimeter hole in 
Daniel Johnson. 
He committed an act clearly dangerous to human life. 
This 8.5 centimeters I think is telling. 8.5 centimeters is 
the intent to cause the serious bodily injury and it is an act 
clearly dangerous to human life which called the death of 
Daniel Johnson. That's murder, and that is what Raul Carrillo 
did, and that is what Alejandro Carrillo helped him to do. 
Or acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life. We have the definition, some 
guidance for depraved indifference to human life, and there has 
been a lot of discussion about CPR, who could have saved whom, 
and the needless death. Your Honor, I would suggest that there 
are a couple of things that evidence the depraved indifference 
on the part of the defendants to human life. The primary one 
is 8.5 centimeters, the wound, plunged the knife into Daniel 
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Johnson. 
There were four people who knew Daniel had been 
stabbed: Daniel himself, Chelsea, Raul, probably or possibly 
Alejandro. He handed the knife to his brother, who plunged the 
knife into Daniel, it would be difficult to argue he didn't 
know he had been stabbed, but I suppose he could. 
Daniel did what many people might do in those 
circumstances. He drove himself to the place where he thought 
he might get help the quickest. He went 8.5 blocks to his 
house. If he had gone to a hospital, if he had done this, if 
he had done that, those aren't defenses to the crime of 
homicide. We don't have somebody who gets shot and bleeds out 
and say, well, the defense is he could have been saved quicker. 
That's not a defense. The Court won't find that in the law. 
Chelsea knew he had been stabbed, but Chelsea was 
attacked by the defendants and knocked unconscious, and when 
she came to it took a while for her to put together what had 
been going on. The Court remembers the testimony she went 
looking for Daniel. She knew at some point he had been stabbed 
and had driven off, but the result of her injuries must have 
been such that as she was coming to she wasn't thinking 
100 percent and started looking for Daniel. 
Raul Carrillo knew that he had just plunged a knife 
all the way into Daniel Johnson's leg. We haven't heard any 
discussion here about how neither of these individuals did 
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anything as well. They knew what had just happened. It may 
seem on its face odd for us to suggest that the stabbers, the 
killers of Daniel Johnson would do something about it. If we 
are going to talk about lifesaving techniques and measures, 
they knew what had happened, and not only did they do nothing, 
they left. Those are circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life. They didn't give a damn. That's 
depraved indifference to human life. He knowingly engaged in 
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another. We 
know it created a grave risk of death, because Daniel Johnson 
is dead. 
Either prong describes — 
THE COURT: That's a bit tautological, isn't it? It 
doesn't say which caused the death, but which created a grave 
risk of death, and the fact that someone ultimately dies 
doesn't establish a grave risk of death. 
MR. HALL: That's for the Court to decide whether an 
8.5-inch hole made by the knife blade --
THE COURT: But the argument you make is we can 
assume that it created a grave risk of death because there was 
a death? 
MR. HALL: No. I concede that just because there was 
a death doesn't necessarily, but I think it is helpful for the 
Court to decide this was a grave risk of death. 
THE COURT: All right. 
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MR. HALL: And so, your Honor, I ask the Court, I ask 
the Court, and having taken an oath to defend the constitution 
and represent the people of the State of Utah, we ask the 
Court, and on behalf of Daniel Johnson's family, who has been 
present throughout these entire proceedings and is present here 
today, and on behalf of Daniel, who canft do it himself, but 
which privilege falls to me, we ask the Court to find the 
defendants guilty of murder. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Heineman? 
MR. HEINEMAN: Does the Court have any initial 
questions? 
THE COURT: Go ahead and start. I do have several 
for you. 
MR. HEINEMAN: I would like to start by saying how 
sorry everyone is that Daniel Johnson is dead. Certainly, he 
did not deserve to die. He should not have died. And we want 
to express our remorse for that situation to his friends, 
family, and all who knew him. Obviously, this isn't a happy 
circumstance, but it has occurred, and here we are trying to 
mop up afterwards. 
In terms of finding Raul Carrillo guilty of this 
offense, I see it as the Court having two possible ways of 
getting there. One is to believe that he confessed to the 
officers that he stabbed Daniel Johnson. The other is to 
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believe Chelsea Stout and her testimony that that is what she 
saw. 
With respect to the confession, the officer spent a 
long time trying to convince Raul Carrillo that he stabbed 
someone, but they donT t get there. They are able to get him to 
repeat words, yeah, I guess I did it. Okay. Yeah, I stabbed 
him. But repeatedly and always he goes back, I don't remember 
having a knife. Ifm not that kind of guy. I am a knuckle up 
kind of guy. I fight with my fists. Looking at his demeanor 
during the course of that video, and, obviously, demeanor is 
easier to see live in person, but it comes out and it just hits 
you, when he is told that he is the one they think stabbed, me, 
for real? And then his head goes down and hits that desk, 
absolutely shocked and canft believe it. 
THE COURT: What do you say to the one time during 
the interview where there does appear to be an unsolicited 
admission, not a repeat, but quote, "Kind of chicken shit for 
me stabbing him, too." 
MR. HEINEMAN: I say that is still in the context of 
these officers trying to say we have all kinds of witnesses and 
everyone saw you do it. We have people in the back seat of the 
car, other people standing around, everyone saying they saw you 
do it. At that point what he is saying is if I were the guy 
who did it, yeah, that would be pretty chicken shit. 
THE COURT: No, it is a different context. The 
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detective is indicating it was kind of chicken shit for Daniel 
to have hit him through the car window, open, and at this point 
in time your client responds, "Yeah, but it was kind of chicken 
shit for me stabbing him, too." 
MR. HEINEMAN: And the words are what they are and 
the Court is reading them correctly. But he is still in the 
mind-set that, oh, my God, there is all this evidence, it seems 
like I am the guy that did it, but I don't remember it, but I 
must be the guy that did it, the cops are saying they are 
trying to cut me some slack, they have all these witnesses, I 
must be the guy. It is a responsive statement saying it is 
chicken shit to just stab somebody. And while it is not 
phrased in the context of, I don't remember having a knife, but 
if I did do it — 
THE COURT: In fairness to you, he does say that a 
little later. 
MR. HEINEMAN: A little later he does. Taken in the 
context throughout he never says, okay, all right, I have been 
leading you on. I did it. I remember. I had a knife. I 
don't know what I was thinking. Throughout, he is saying, and 
I will paraphrase, I am screwing myself over, but I don't 
remember having a knife. Repeatedly throughout that. And the 
officers keep going. You are going to look like a fool on the 
stand. You can't say that. The judge isn't going to buy it. 
You need to man up, take responsibility. I don't remember. 
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And then we have the end of the interview, and we 
didnTt play the whole thing, but 15 minutes of unconsolable 
sobbing. I think it is clear from watching the interview that 
Raul didn't know there was a video camera in the corner, and 
the officers kept, well, we will turn the tape off. What do 
you want to tell us now? Every time that happens, I don't 
remember having a knife. It was news to him. 
Now, it was clear from the interview that he had 
heard about Daniel. He had seen the obituary in the paper. He 
knew the night had gone terribly wrong, and Daniel had died as 
a result. So it wasn't a surprise that somebody died. That's 
not where the sobbing and this reaction is coming from. This 
reaction is coming from, people are saying it is me that did 
that? I am the one who did that? That's where the shock is. 
It is not that Daniel had died. He already knew that. He had 
seen the obituary. He said that at the end. Our families know 
each other. We had been hanging at the party for hours and 
hours and hours. He honestly doesn't remember stabbing him. 
And I would assert to the Court that there is 
certainly a reasonable doubt as to who did. The testimony was 
we can't ascertain exactly how many people were there. We know 
there were some people there, Cole Peterson and whoever he was 
with, who weren't inside of the party. There may have been 
others. We don't know. We don't know how many cars there 
were. This was a riot, a melee, people everywhere fighting, 
227 
crazmess going on. 
We do know the Polynesians that invaded the home, 
several of them got stabbed. It is reasonable to draw 
inferences that perhaps that might upset them, that perhaps 
that might get them to want to retaliate in some fashion. We 
have evidence of the drive-by shooting some period of time 
later, where a whole slew of bullets are sent at this 
particular apartment house. 
The situation we are dealing with, five home invaders 
forcing their way in, fighting with people, trying to steal 
beer, broken glass, people thrown through windows, chaos. We 
have got the people at the party and these invaders. Does it 
make sense that in all of that Raul Carrillo would deliberately 
go to stab one of the people he has been hanging at the party 
with, Daniel Pacheco, Simon Apodaca, Chelsea Stout, Daniel 
Johnson? That doesn't make sense. Does it make sense for a 
big Polynesian, either one of the five that went in, or someone 
associated with them outside, would be upset that they were 
stabbed inside in the course of trying to do this beer heist 
burglary? 
THE COURT: I have two questions for you. One, what 
do you say to Mr. Hall!s response that there is nothing wrong 
with the dying declaration that he was killed by a big 
Polynesxan, and that, in fact, your client in some regards 
meets that description? 
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MR. HEINEMAN: I would say that is counteracted by 
the fact that Daniel was there with him for 8.5 hours. They 
knew each other. Chelsea, obviously, is very up and aware of 
different cultures and cultural differences. She had no 
problem saying Mexican, Mexican, Samoan. 
THE COURT: Second, during the interview of your 
client, there is no question, you are correct, that he 
repeatedly denies any recollection of using a knife. But he 
never denies, if I recall correctly, going to the car and 
striking the deceased, the victim. 
MR. HEINEMAN: He never denies going to a car and 
striking the occupant of that car. There is a whole bunch of 
fighting going on all over the street. 
THE COURT: I will go back and I'm certainly going to 
relook at everything, but my recollection is that he 
acknowledges striking, he pretty candidly acknowledges striking 
the victim. 
MR. HEINEMAN: But that's after he is steered by the 
police officer, it is you, we saw you, the colors are close 
enough, they match, this is you, this is what happened. We 
don't know whether there is another car, Raul is there having a 
fistfight with a guy there, and one of the Polynesians is there 
stabbing Daniel. Certainly possible that that is what 
happened. 
THE COURT: Your suggestion is go back and look at it 
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harder, Judge, because I think he is being led into that? 
MR. HEINEMAN: The cop is jumping to the assumption 
we are talking about Daniel's car, and Raul gets led along with 
that, but we don't know. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
MR. HEINEMAN: Raul's statement is that he is 
directly in front of the apartment house where he is having his 
fight. The diagram we have here, Exhibit 14, Daniel's car is 
further along on the street. Raul could have been right in 
front with the car, two cars behind Daniel's car, duking it out 
with some other person. We don't know who. Cole Peterson, 
maybe. He hasn't been helpful to come here and show up. 
Nobody has been helpful in terms of coming forward and 
testifying, other than Chelsea, obviously. 
With respect to Chelsea, she is not crystal clear in 
her memory. She is all over the map. Mr. Hall says, well, 
this is the one thing she is consistent about. Well, it is the 
one thing she wants to be consistent about. Every other detail 
seems to kind of get lost. Well, he said, I love you, as he 
drives off right after he got stabbed. No, no, he never said 
anything. 
I sat there — I stood there at the podium at the 
preliminary hearing, and she lied under oath, right to my face, 
repeatedly. She admitted that here on the stand. We instruct 
jurors that if someone has lied once you can toss everything 
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out. Obviously, that's a bit mechanistic. I am not suggesting 
that people should automatically toss things out, but it sure 
creates doubt. 
Her initial report to the police, nothing about a 
stabbing of my boyfriend. It is, ow, my ribs hurt. I got beat 
up. She knows she is okay. Yeah, she is in pain. She knows 
she is not in any peril. She is saying she watched her 
boyfriend, her fiancee get stabbed. She saw it once. She 
knows it happened more than once. Not a word comes up? That 
doesnft make sense, Judge. 
Later she finds out, oh, my gosh, Daniel is dead. 
She tries to put things together. She wants to find something. 
I think she is confused. Obviously, she had been talking to 
Raul. They had been talking about tattoos, been showing 
tattoos, saying I know someone who can get yours fixed up, get 
it done right. Sure she knows about the Joker tattoo. The 
question is, did she actually see who did it, and was it Raul? 
Other aspects of what she told us. Knock on the 
door, a bit before 5:00 in the morning, at somebody else!s 
house, she says she is the one that goes and answers the door. 
And then she gets in the face of five big Polynesians. I guess 
Justin Shelton wasn't Polynesian. Four Polynesians and Justin 
Shelton. Then she says she gets slammed down to the ground, 
hand in the face, forced down. 
What's the next part of the story? Her boyfriend, 
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who loves her, wants to protect her and be with her, I will 
just scurry out the door and let these guys beat up my 
girlfriend. Does that make sense? It doesn't make sense to 
me. 
Her testimony at the preliminary hearing, Daniel gets 
stabbed, he says out the window of the car, I love you, and 
drives off, as she is forced to the ground and kicked by 
Samoans and beaten up. I love you, Babe. Good luck getting 
beaten up right now. Sorry about that. I got to go. That 
doesn't make sense. If she had said that he said, Run, 
Chelsea, run, I can believe that, that makes sense. I love 
you. Drive off. Doesn't make sense. And then, of course, we 
hear yesterday, no, no, he never said that. I'm not sure which 
is the lie, the preliminary hearing or here, one of them is, 
because they are diametrically opposed. 
In terms of possible bias, Chelsea talked about how 
Raul was hitting on her. After the fact, her last night with 
her boyfriend, and some guy was hitting on her? That would 
make her angry. In the interview with Detective Parks Daniel 
didn't care. That's fine. Whatever. Guys being guys. Her 
testimony yesterday, of course, it would make him mad. 
I'm not sure what's going on there. Possibilities, 
well, maybe Daniel doesn't love her as much as she thinks he 
should. One possibility, well, I will get even with someone 
for that. Another possibility, well, why am I wasting my time 
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talking to some other guy the night that my boyfriend dies? 
Thatfs a possibility. 
Thrown over the top of all of that, five shots of 
brandy, two beers, one line of coke, being knocked out, coming 
to inside the house with the police there, this is someone who 
isn't able to accurately recall, who is confused, doesn't 
understand what's going on, that's only heightened later when 
she finds out that Daniel has died, and in trying to piece it 
together and make sense out of things, well, yeah, this is what 
must have happened. 
Were there two people in the back seat of Daniel's 
car? Certainly, no one came in to testify saying I was there 
and this is what I saw. But she testifies, well, she says in 
the Parks interview, Beverly, she points out where exactly 
Beverly is sitting. There was the other woman there. We 
crawled out the window together. Yesterday, no, it was just 
me. Whole people are disappearing here. But the State is 
asking you, well, never mind the man behind the curtain. 
Consistent on this one thing, yeah, why don't we find Raul and 
Alex guilty of murder. I would submit that there is doubt 
there. 
In terms of the degree of offenses, for the murder 
offense there has to be the intent to cause serious bodily 
injury. 
Homicide by assault, and I would point out to the 
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Court that an aggravated assault is an assault. It absolutely 
meets the definition of homicide by assault. There is nothing 
in there saying but this is not applicable if a weapon is used. 
Any kind of an attempt to cause bodily injury, with or without 
a weapon, if death results, thatrs homicide by assault. 
The distinction there is the intent. What are you 
trying to accomplish? If you are trying to seriously mess 
somebody up, possibly kill them, permanently disfigure them, 
cause them the loss of use of a bodily member for a protracted 
period of time, that bumps it up to murder. 
If you are just trying to hurt somebody, then we are 
dealing with a homicide by assault. A knife wound. If we go 
to the ERfs, they see them every, single day. If you ever talk 
to a medical student that works in an inner city hospital, you 
know they have acronyms for what they see on a regular basis. 
GSW, gunshot wound, knife wounds. They see it all the time. 
A knife wound generally isn't fatal. There are 
exceptions. Stab somebody in the throat or neck, boom, serious 
problems. Stab somebody in the heart, boom, serious problems. 
Stab somebody elsewhere in the chest, we are down a level, 
still extremely threatening, a serious problem, but not as 
immediately life threatening as a neck or a heart wound. 
Stab somebody in the thigh, what's supposed to happen 
with that? It is supposed to hurt. It is supposed to bleed a 



























They are supposed to be okay. I have got a cousin who stabbed 
himself in the thigh. He was in a fraternity at Michigan State 
University. He was playing a game with a knife trying to poke 
around your fingers, he missed and stabbed himself in the 
thigh. Goes to the emergency room, friends take him there, 
gets stitched up, cops are called, gets interrogated for some 
period of time, give him up. We know somebody stabbed you. 
No, really, it was me. I was at the fraternity house. I did 
it myself. No, no, we don't believe that. That's what is 
supposed to happen with a knife wound. 
What happened in this case, convergence of two 
necessary things. Number one, it was a very unique wound, 
partially transecting the artery. If it had missed the artery,, 
no problem, would have been a case just like my cousin's, go 
get a couple of stitches, good to go. If it had completely 
transected the artery, again, the artery would pinch off 
itself. We have all kinds of boys and girls coming home from 
Iraq with no legs. They don't bleed to death. It is this 
unique type of wound, number one. 
Number two, lack of first aid. Daniel goes home. He 
wants to get help. In terms of first aid rendered, nobody 
grabs on. No one tries to stop the bleeding. What should have 
been done? Somebody should have grabbed on, pressed as hard as 
they could, as if someone's life depended on it, and it did. 
Four cops, hey, let's stand around and watch this guy 
bleed out. Gee, I donft want to get blood on my uniform. I 
hear sirens somewhere. We will just wait until the EMS people 
are here. Those six minutes the ME testified could well have 
been critical. No question about it. 
So those two things, very unique wound, which isnTt 
expected. And when someone stabs someone in the leg, they are 
not expecting, hey, I am going to get lucky and partially 
transect a major branch of the femoral artery, and then maybe 
the guy wonf t get first aid and I might get lucky and get a 
kill. That's not the thought process. It is an I am going to 
stick you. 
It is not an intent to try to kill. You try to kill, 
throat, chest, or multiple, again and again and again and 
again, cases where we have 15, 20, 30 stab wounds, yeah, there 
you have got an intent. It is evident. This isn!t just a 
stick it to you, this is going to hurt you a little bit, take 
you out of the action for the rest of the fight, but you will 
be back another day, but a single knife wound to the thigh. 
Mr. Hall made much of the 8.5 centimeters. The quadriceps is 
the second-largest muscle in the human body, second only to the 
gluteus maximus. It is a big muscle. It can take a big knife 
wound, and most of them are just fine. 
If the Court finds that Raul Carrillo is responsible 
for this, what level of offense should he be guilty of? You 
saw the interview there. I think it is clear from that he 
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never intended to kill anybody. I have never killed anybody in 
my life, sobbing wildly. The nature, the location of the 
wound. Lower thigh. Thatfs not where you go to kill somebody. 
Our special forces arenft taught, hey, this is a special spot 
here. Go for the thigh about 4 or 5 inches up from the 
kneecap. Nonsense. You do that, the other person is still in 
it and you are dead. You want to kill somebody, neck, chest. 
Thigh, it is an assault, it obviously has the intent to injure 
someone, cause them pain. It doesn't have the intent to cause 
serious bodily injury. 
If the Court doesn't buy that argument and finds that 
there is the intent to do serious bodily injury here, I would 
submit the most we can get is manslaughter. The statute, 
76-5-204 subsection (4), it is an affirmative defense to a 
charge of murder or attempted murder that the defendant caused 
the death of another or attempted to cause the death under the 
influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse. This is an affirmative 
defense. Under the law of Utah, the State has the obligation 
of disproving affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This isn't a case where the Court has to say beyond a 
reasonable doubt I can say there is extreme emotional 
disturbance. If the Court is unable to say beyond a reasonable 
doubt that there is no extreme emotional disturbance for which 
there is a reasonable excuse, then this section is applicable. 
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And in terms of disproving that there is extreme emotional 
distress for which there is a reasonable excuse, the State has 
utterly failed to disprove that beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Home invasion burglary, fighting, people getting 
stabbed, people getting thrown through windows, people fleeing 
from the place, there is a huge disturbance there. In his 
interview Raul said repeatedly, I was afraid. I didn?t know 
what was going to happen. I didnf t know if they had guns. I 
know the PVCCfs like to shoot. That's an extreme emotional 
disturbance. Did Raul cause that? No, the five home invaders 
got everything rolling and things went wild from there. So 
murder is out of the question. Extreme emotional disturbance, 
at a minimum, would bring that down to manslaughter. 
I would submit the wound, the location, that there is 
only one, indicates only an intent to cause bodily injury. 
There is no intent to cause something life threatening. In the 
ordinary course, absent these two extraordinary circumstances, 
this wouldnTt be a life-threatening wound. 
In sum, I would ask to find the Court to find Raul 
Carrillo not guilty. If the Court does find that he is 
responsible, I would suggest that the maximum he is guilty of 
is homicide by assault. 
If there are no further questions, I will submit it. 
MS. GEORGE: Your Honor, I know that you have, 
obviously, listened to the testimony and listened to argument. 
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I would just ask the Court to key in on a couple of issues. 
First of all, separate defendant, separate issues, separate 
conduct alleged. That?s why you have two counsel. So I would 
ask the Court to look at whatfs alleged against Alejandro 
Carrillo specifically as to what's charged against him. In 
that situation I think the Court needs to look at what has not 
been proven by the State. 
I would ask the Court to consider the statute 
76-5-206, negligent homicide, in the event that the Court is 
not going to issue an acquittal, which is what I believe is 
appropriate as to Alejandro Carrillo. If the Court is not 
going to go there, I would like the Court to look at 76-5-206, 
and with that in the definitions of the criminal code there is 
76-2-103 (4), which is the definition of criminal negligence. 
Additionally, the statute right below that in the code book 
talks about what the culpable mental state is. And take that 
into consideration when looking at the elements that I would 
like to point out. 
THE COURT: Ms. George, what are the theoretical 
options available to the Court? 
MS. GEORGE: In this situation, what the Court needs 
to take into consideration is the testimony that was presented 
to you. 
THE COURT: No, just legally, what are, in your view, 
the theoretical options? 
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MS. GEORGE: I believe the theoretical options — 
THE COURT: Clearly murder. 
MS. GEORGE: Which I don!t believe is appropriate. 
THE COURT: I am not asking you to argue right now. 
MS. GEORGE: You have got homicide, homicide by 
assault, you have got criminal negligence. There is even, as I 
flip through here, I see a bunch of them. 
THE COURT: Do I have manslaughter? 
MS. GEORGE: I believe that is out of the question as 
to Alejandro. I think what you need to look at is the criminal 
negligence. I would even point to 76-5-112, reckless 
endangerment. 
THE COURT: Why would you say it is out of the 
question with respect to Alejandro? 
MS. GEORGE: Because I think in order to get to 
manslaughter and to get to murder you still have to have the 
intentional conduct, you have to have the culpable mens rea of 
that person to get to that person. My concern with having the 
Court make that leap from criminal negligence or reckless 
endangerment to homicide or to manslaughter, where are you 
going to find the culpable mens rea, the mental state from this 
individual? First of all, you have to find what he actually 
handed was a knife. You didn!t hear that evidence come from 
Chelsea Stout. He handed him something. I didn't see it. 
THE COURT: Let!s just assume, for the sake of 
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argument, that he hands a knife. Isnft that party liability? 
Doesn!t that establish party liability? 
MS, GEORGE: Not when you look at the context. If 
you consider what Mr. Heineman is arguing, which is you have 
Tongans, and I am not trying to use racial slurs, I am using 
what the witnesses said here, you have big Polynesians, 
Tongans, these islanders fighting with the Mexicans, it is a 
gang fight, thatfs what it is. You have Tongans there. There 
was also testimony that someone, in the interview of Raul, some 
person came and pulled him back from the car. You have got 
Chelsea testifying that Tongans are kicking, punching, 
assaulting her. So you can't look at what's happening right 
here in a vacuum. 
THE COURT: Your point is if you find he hands him a 
knife, that's not sufficient for party liability. There has to 
be some mens rea connecting the knife to an anticipated 
assault, aggravated assault, or attempted murder, murder of the 
victim, versus using it potentially defensively during the 
fight. 
MS. GEORGE: Absolutely. What we are not looking at 
is you have your "X" for Chelsea, your "X" for Daniel. What 
you are not taking into consideration or what I worry needs to 
be taken into consideration is this isn't happening in a 
vacuum. You still have got people spilling out into the 
street. The fighting is still going on. Cole is driving his 
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vehicle to get away, he drives over Chelsea, or hits her with 
the car. You have got people still fighting. The fight has 
tumbled from the apartment with the broken windows, and the 
people going at it from the apartment into the street. You 
have people jumping into cars trying to get out of there. You 
have got fighting still going on. 
If you believe what Chelsea said about Tongans 
pushing her down and kicking her and assaulting her and this is 
all going on right here, then you have to understand that if 
the Court is going to believe that this gentleman handed that 
gentleman a knife, what's the intent, what's the purpose? Is 
it just to stab the person in the car? Is that what he thinks 
is going on? Or is it for self-defense? If you have five 
Tongans and one Mexican at the door of the car, what's the 
intent for handing him the knife? 
There has been absolutely no testimony that words 
were exchanged. In fact, what Chelsea Stout testified to under 
oath in this trial is no words were exchanged. Absolutely no 
discussion between Alex and Raul. Alex is in the car. She 
testified he is in the car, and then he gets out of their car 
and comes up and hands something, although she doesn't see what 
it is. She testified she didn't see. 
THE COURT: She says it is almost instantaneous. She 
doesn't see what the object is at first, but the object 
immediately transforms itself into a butterfly knife. 
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MS. GEORGE: If the Court is familiar with a 
butterfly knife, where is that? Is that in his pocket, his 
jacket, his Levis? Where is the knife and how does she know 
that's the object he hands him? I will get into the 
credibility of Chelsea Stout. 
The issue is you have got to still find, as the trier 
of fact, what his intent was. Is it because he knows that he 
is going to open the knife and stab Daniel Johnson? Or is it 
self-defense for the five Tongans who are beating up people 
standing by the car? What is he going to do with it? Because 
no words were exchanged. 
And to point to the testimony of the medical 
examiner, who has testified, as he stated, all over the state, 
repeated trials, Dr. Grey said, you know, this is not an 
immediate lethal injury. Those were his words. It doesnft put 
out huge amounts of blood. It is a slowly, and I quote, 
"slowly evolving problem" was his testimony. If adequate care 
is given --
THE COURT: Can the Court, can I, if I find it 
appropriate, convict of a lesser-included nobody asks for? 
MS. GEORGE: I believe so. I absolutely believe so. 
Why canTt a jury acquit the jury nullification if an attorney 
doesn't argue that? You, as the finder of fact, with your 
knowledge of the code, absolutely. 
THE COURT: All right. 
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Mr. Heineman? 
MR. HEINEMAN: I believe the law says the Court is 
only allowed to look at what is actually presented in terms of 
requested instructions. If a defendant decides to go all or 
nothing, that's their choice. Ifm pretty sure that!s what the 
law is, as far as that goes. 
MS. GEORGE: Then we differ on that, because we are 
not submitting instructions. Does the Court have a statute in 
mind? 
THE COURT: No. Just asking. 
MS. GEORGE: I would point the Court back again to 
Todd Grey, whose testimony was this was a partial transection 
of an artery, and had the artery been severed there would have 
been less loss of blood because it would have stretched and 
essentially closed off. You are not talking about a medical 
student. You are not talking about someone who dissects 
people. You are talking about an individual in a fight with 
five very large Tongans, as described by Chelsea, huge men, one 
of them whose hand completely covered her face, she described 
how tall, how big, in this fight. Where the knife wound comes 
in is not a knife wound to the face, it is not a knife wound to 
the neck, it is not a knife wound to the chest, it is 5 inches 
above the knee. 5 inches above the knee. And it becomes a 
partial transection of an artery. 
So where is the intent from that to this person 
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handing him the knife? I just don!t think that any of that 
evidence was presented to the Court, that the knowledge and the 
intent is there. If the Court looks at 76-2-104, which talks 
about the culpable mental state and the higher mental states 
included, again, I just don't think the Court gets there. If 
you go back to negligent homicide, it discusses that someone 
acting with criminal negligence engages in that conduct. 
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, 
acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another. 
THE COURT: What are the lesser includeds that you 
are specifically asking the Court to consider? 
MS. GEORGE: I would ask the Court to consider the 
negligent homicide statute, 76-5-206; and reckless 
endangerment, 76-5-112. I know the State obviously is going to 
disagree with that. But I think that touches on that. 
THE COURT: What about homicide by assault? 
MS. GEORGE: I would ask the Court to consider that 
as well. 
THE COURT: What about manslaughter? 
MS. GEORGE: Your Honor, I would ask the Court not to 
consider that in relation to my client, because I don't believe 
it meets the elements for him. I realize the State is asking 
that, short of murder, that that's what the Court needs to 
consider. 
THE COURT: Mr. Heineman, same question to you. 
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MR. HEINEMAN: I believe the appropriate 
considerations are the murder as charged, the manslaughter and 
the homicide by assault. 
THE COURT: And the State1s position? Murder as 
charged? 
MR. HALL: And manslaughter. The State does not 
believe that homicide by assault or negligent homicide are 
appropriately considered lesser-included offenses, because the 
State believes that there has not been evidence to meet those 
elements, which are required for the trier of fact to consider 
a lesser-included offense. 
MS. GEORGE: Your Honor, I realize that we have gone 
over the inconsistent statements, but in preservation of the 
record I just want to touch on some quick points, in relation 
to this, what the State has talked about is uncontroverted, 
salient evidence. I would ask the Court to look at that. 
ThatT s what they are asking for. They said to the Court, You 
have seen uncontroverted, salient evidence. The only 
uncontroverted, salient evidence that came into this case at 
all was the statement of Daniel Johnson. 
When law enforcement officers get to the scene and he 
is there and he is bleeding and they say, Who did this to you? 
Who did this to you? The big Polynesian stabbed me. He has 
been partying all night long with these two. And if you listen 
to the statements again, their families know each other. 
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Polynesians, Mexicans. They know who is a Polynesian and they 
know who is a Mexican. The only uncontroverted, salient 
evidence was by the victim himself. And who the Court is going 
to find more believable, Daniel Johnson or Chelsea Stout, is 
whatfs at issue. 
Chelsea Stout testified here under oath no discussion 
between these two, didn!t see what he handed him, all she sees 
is that a knife is produced. Then she says to the Court, Go 
ahead and believe I am in the driveway, it is dark outside, 
this car is parked under a street light, and I can see from the 
driveway to the vehicle, and I can see through the vehicle to 
where this melee is occurring right here. So she is looking 
from here through the car to the melee here. ThatT s where she 
supposedly sees this. 
I asked her, who else climbed out that window with 
you? This fight is going on, these giant Tongans, Polynesians, 
are breaking into the home, the glass is shattering. Who 
climbed with you to escape this? Your boyfriend is gone. He 
went out the front door. Who climbed out the window with you? 
Nobody. I grabbed the keys. Who got in the car with you? 
Nobody. By myself. 
But the day after this happened she is with this 
homicide detective in the police station being interviewed and 
she says there was Beverly and another girl, donf t remember her 
name, and we together climb out the window, we escape, we get 
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the keys, we climb through the window together, we hop in the 
car, and they are in the back of the car. But the State is 
saying disregard the fact that two women have completely 
disappeared from her story, two women have completely 
disappeared. Don't worry about that fact. Don't worry about 
the fact that she lied at the preliminary hearing, and they can 
characterize it anyway they want. She lied. She said she 
didn't use cocaine, Daniel didn't use cocaine. She lied. But, 
oh, by the way, believe here today that she is telling the 
truth about a blue-handled butterfly knife. And somehow she 
sees the handle on the butterfly knife through the vehicle, in 
the dark, even though she didn't see what Alex handed to Raul. 
The problem is you can't just take it in a vacuum. 
You have to assess her credibility. You, as the trier of fact, 
have to assess her believability. And I put to the Court if 
you stand Chelsea Stout up and her statement, it just isn't 
going to pass muster. That isn't uncontroverted evidence. 
That's a young, 16-year-old girl, who has been 
boozing it up all night, drinking shots, doing cocaine, been up 
for hours, because by now it is 5:00 in the morning, so she 
hasn't been asleep, partying all night long with these guys. 
And if you believe what she says about being knocked 
unconscious, whether it is at the front door when she is hit 
initially when the Tongans come through the door, whether it is 
knocked unconscious at the car by Raul where she claims she is 
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assaulted, or knocked unconscious by the Tongans when they beat 
her down, or when she is hit by the vehicle with Cole, the fact 
is her story has changed six times. 
And interesting was when I asked Detective Parks, 
whatTs the purpose of the victim's witness statement, which the 
Court has as an exhibit? And he said it is a serious crime, 
and you want their memory fresh. You want a fresh recollection 
of what happened there, so hand them this statement and they 
fill it out. If the Court meets that, she doesn't even mention 
the stabbing. Doesn't even mention it. And she testified cops 
come. She tells them, I have been beat up by the Tongans, all 
these things occurred, but she fails to mention my fiance, my 
boyfriend, he was stabbed and he is driving off. Never even 
tells the police that Daniel was stabbed. None of this comes 
up, none of the King Joker stuff, the stabbing, I believe it 
was these people comes up until after she finds out Daniel is 
dead. 
THE COURT: Maybe doesn't that explain why she 
doesn't know what has happened to him, she doesn't know he is 
dead, so why mention --
MS. GEORGE: I don't know, if I saw my fiance being 
stabbed repeatedly by somebody, and the cops came up and are 
trying to render aid, I think I would say my boyfriend was 
stabbed repeatedly. Oh, my God, he is gone, go find him. She 
doesn't even mention that. And the curiosity is she does 
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mention the day after to the homicide detective, Okay, he is 
stabbed, and it is King Joker, and I think his name is Gabriel. 
THE COURT: She knows he is dead at that point in 
time. 
MS. GEORGE: Now she knows he is dead. Now I have to 
catch the killer. Now I have to tell the homicide detective 
enough facts to get the person who killed my fiance. What does 
she tell him? I crawled out the bedroom window with Beverly 
and the other girl. Daniel is hiding up on the carport. It is 
this person named King Joker, I think his real name is Gabriel, 
and she describes the clothing in detail. 
But what she describes varies from what she told the 
officer the night before, as far as clothing descriptions, who 
was there and what occurred. Even then you have got differing 
descriptions. If what she is telling him is so important, 
because thatTs to catch him, why then at the preliminary 
hearing does she differ yet again? Why then from the 
preliminary hearing to trial does she differ yet again? And I 
am just asking the Court to consider, why drop out Beverly and 
the other woman when you are escaping from this horrible fight 
and melee? Where did they go? 
And she is adamant in her testimony, what she is 
saying to the Court is, I assume. When I asked, you said he 
was stabbed multiple times, then you say he is stabbed once, 
well, I assumed he was. If what you are looking at is the 
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alcohol, the drugs and a young, scared, frightened 16-year-old 
girl who is upset, you canft find this man guilty based on her 
assumptions. She assumes it was a knife. She assumes he 
handed him a knife. That isn't sufficient for reasonable 
doubt. And when you try it before a jury you ask repeatedly 
for the jury to remember what the burden of proof is and it is 
the reasonable doubt. 
Is a young, coked-up, drunk, 16-year-old girl who is 
frightened, assumptions that vary on some details, is that 
still sufficient reasonable doubt that he had a knife and that 
he handed that knife to his brother? I submit to the Court 
that it isnft sufficient. 
And again to look at the medical examiner's testimony 
discussing what occurred. I would also ask the Court to look 
at the fact that you have got 35 fingerprints, you have got DNA 
samples, blood samples, you have got all kinds of physical 
evidence that was collected by the homicide detective, and not 
one piece came back, not one piece, not one bloodstain, not one 
palm print, not one fingerprint came back to either of the 
Carrillo brothers, not one thing. And we don't know what comes 
back to any of the Tongans, the four large Tongans and Justin 
Shelton who were there, because they werenTt even tested. They 
weren't even tested. 
I would ask again, as I said, for the Court to look 
at the fact that in order to satisfy the statutes that the 
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State is putting up before the Court you have got to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that somehow the mens rea with my 
client, Alejandro Carrillo, was there, and I just don't think 
it is with their statutes. 
Does the Court have any other questions? 
THE COURT: No. 
Mr. Hall? 
MR. HALL: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, may it 
please the Court, may I, let me address Ms. George's statements 
first, because they are the most recent and maybe fresh in our 
minds. Your Honor, not all memories are equal. When someone 
is remembering what the name of the person was who went out the 
back door, how many people are in the car, that's different 
from the memory who killed your boyfriend. 
In fact, I would expect a witness who is telling the 
truth and remembering accurately from a long time ago to be 
clear on some things and less clear on others. Because if she 
were 100 percent on everything, I would suspect somebody got 
ahold of her and gave her the transcript and let her read all 
of the stuff and here you go. 
So, frankly, your Honor, I think the fact that she at 
one point remembered someone in the car and now doesn't, but is 
real clear on who killed her boyfriend and who was there when 
the knife was handed to the boyfriend — 
THE COURT: What about the fact she admitted she 
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perjured herself at the preliminary hearing? 
MR. HALL: On the elements in which she was 
dishonest, they were elements that dealt with things that she 
found embarrassing. She had been using drugs. She had been 
drinking. Things that she didnTt want to admit at the time. 
And we elicited there, and I said, Well, that wasn't entirely 
true, was it? And she said, Well, it wasn't completely false, 
either. And maybe of greater importance, Ifm not sure, when I 
asked her to clarify that, the only relevance of drinking and 
having drugs would be her ability to perceive the events 
accurately and to remember them. 
THE COURT: Would you, in all candor, absent the 
interview with Raul Carrillo, be standing before me suggesting 
that the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt establishes the 
defendants are guilty of murder here? 
MR. HALL: It is a difficult hypothetical question 
for me to answer. 
THE COURT: That's why I asked it, Mr. Hall. 
MR. HALL: Because it requires me to analyze, really, 
the totality of the evidence absent a critical piece of 
evidence. 
THE COURT: That's right. It really asks you to 
focus in on the testimony of an individual witness, who, 
candidly, has been inconsistent on a number of important 
events. 
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MR. HALL: And I concede that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And would you truly be standing up here 
at this time with that in mind, given everything else, 
suggesting, absent the interview, that there is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt? 
MR. HALL: Well, again, for me to answer that 
question, I would really have to think through it more than --
THE COURT: You can punt if you want to, thatfs fine. 
MR. HALL: The two seconds I have got to really go 
through the analysis. Because as I indicated the proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt is the sum total of all the evidence that we 
presented to the Court. So forgive me — 
THE COURT: I will accept the punt. 
MR. HALL: Very well. 
THE COURT: What about the mens rea requirement for 
party liability? Would you agree, let's say that the knife was 
handed, the Court finds the knife was handed by Alejandro 
Carrillo to Raul Carrillo ten minutes before any stabbing took 
place. 
MR. HALL: And I think that there is a sufficient 
separation, I think the connection would be so tenuous that 
there wouldn!t be party liability. 
THE COURT: For party liability to exist, in the 
State's view, what does the defendantfs motive have to be? 
MR. HALL: It has to be the same as the actor for 
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whom we are ascribing the liability. And I think that is 
clearly proved in this case, and I will tell you why. 
Ms. George suggested to you that you shouldn't evaluate this 
diagram and this evidence in a vacuum, which is true. But I 
disagree with her recollection of the testimony at the time. 
The Court will review it and the Court will use its own 
recollection of evidence presented to it. As I recall the 
testimony there were not Tongans, five or any number of Tongans 
anywhere near this vehicle when Chelsea and the defendants and 
the victim were present. In fact, the testimony was that as 
Raul, the stabber, was walking away, there were words, and he 
returned to the vehicle, and then a fight ensued. 
THE COURT: Doesn't Chelsea in her statement say that 
the Polynesians were there, in fact identify them as the people 
that knocked her unconscious outside the vehicle and kicked 
her? 
MR. HALL: No. 
THE COURT: Take a look at the statement, Mr. Hall. 
MR. HALL: My recollection is she believed there was 
somebody else, because she knew there was more than one person. 
THE COURT: Read the statement. Doesn't she 
expressly say it was the Polynesians that beat her outside of 
the vehicle? 
MR. HALL: Is the Court referring to this statement? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
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MR. HALL: No, your Honor. The statement says, "We 
were sitting there with a Tongan or Samoan and he left because 
his ride was here and then they came back in and started 
fighting, and when they all came in they started fighting and 
beat me up." That!s the end of the statement. Doesn't say 
anything about a vehicle or Raul or Alejandro or anything else. 
I don't believe this statement has anything to do with the 
stabbing at the vehicle at all. I believe this statement is 
only speaking to the initial entry into the apartment by the 
Tongans, the melee that goes on in the apartment. 
THE COURT: She isn't referring to being beaten up by 
them outside of the car? 
MR. HALL: No, I don't believe that's what the 
statement pertains to at all. 
So the Court now must consider, and the Court will 
remember the instruction that we give to juries, that the proof 
of intent is rarely susceptible to proof by direct evidence. 
And we know that. That's our trade, is inferring intent from 
the conduct that's going on here. The conduct that the 
testimony described was a fight between defendant Raul and 
Daniel Johnson, and Alejandro handing something, and 
immediately thereafter the knife comes out and Daniel is 
stabbed. 
There is no evidence of self-defense. There is no 
suggestion that maybe Alejandro was handing the knife to Raul 
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to defend himself. All we know it was a fistfight. And there 
is simply no evidence to suggest anything other than a common 
or a similar intent, and the only intent that we need to 
develop for party liability and I submit for murder is this 
basic intent of taking a knife blade, at least 8.5 centimeters, 
and plunging it into Daniel Johnson's leg. 
The knife wasn't there to show somebody and say get 
back. The knife wasn? t there to show them I have a neat knife. 
The knife wasn't there for a hypothetical ridiculous purpose. 
The knife was there to cause damage to Daniel Johnson. That's 
why Alejandro handed it to Raul, and thatTs why Raul 
immediately thereafter thrusted it into the leg of Daniel 
Johnson. I think that the Court ought to find that they are 
yoked together, mens rea, with the intent, such that party 
liability is established. 
Your Honor, I don't know to what extent — we have 
discussed the credibility of Chelsea. I can't leave the one 
remark undone. I appreciate I am not arguing to a jury, I am 
arguing to the Court, but to characterize Chelsea as a young, 
coked-up, drunk, 16-year-old, aside from being offensive, I 
think fundamentally misrepresents the testimony. I asked her 
and she testified about the effects of the alcohol and the drug 
on her, and she remembered and testified to details clearly, 
and has, Ms. George suggests to you, changed her story six 
times, but she has never changed her story who killed her 
257 
boyfriend, and she has never changed her story who was there, 
who handed an object to the killer of her boyfriend. Not six 
times, five, four, three, two, one, never. She has never 
changed her story on the most important point. And I think the 
Court will appreciate, as I began, that not all memories are 
equal. We would expect her to remember better those who were 
responsible for her boyfriend!s death, and the circumstances 
surrounding those. 
Your Honor, I invite additional questions the Court 
might have, because I would like to move on — 
THE COURT: No, move on. 
MR. HALL: — to Mr. Heineman!s points. As I 
mentioned, the failure to get first aid, that's not a defense. 
It is not an element of anything. Frankly, I don't think it is 
relevant. Mr. Heineman suggested to the Court more than once 
that he didn't have an intent to kill, which we have never 
argued, and we discussed that. 
I think Mr. Heineman raised an interesting point 
about the confession. And while the confession was being 
played I made a note of the same line that the Court did. It 
was almost made as a passing remark, which I think gives it 
even greater weight and credibility. And what's telling is 
Raul's statement repeatedly that, I don't remember the knife. 
He remembers and admits to everything else, but he doesn't 
remember the knife. I can't comment on people who invoke the 
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privilege against self incrimination. 
THE COURT: Nor should you. 
MR. HALL: Nor will I. But when they talk, I can 
comment on that, and what they say and what they don't say I 
think is very telling, and what rings in my mind is, I don't 
remember the knife. Not, I didn't do it. It was, I don't 
remember. And as the interview progressed we got closer to the 
truth. It started out from, I don't know what you are talking 
about, to, I don't remember it, to a casual comment that the 
Court has already picked up on and one that I put a star by as 
we were going by, which I think is a very telling and powerful 
and convincing admission that Raul stabbed Daniel Johnson. 
A couple of points, and then I will conclude. As the 
Court knows, reckless conduct is when one is aware, but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustified risk, and 
it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care. I 
think the Court would not be inappropriate to consider and 
apply that standard to the conduct of these defendants. I, as 
I did before, would suggest that it rises beyond that, and 
their conduct qualifies as murder, as the legislature has seen 
fit to define murder. To engage in conduct with a depraved 
indifference to human life, a person must do more than act 
recklessly, but he need not have as his conscious objective or 
desire to cause the result, nor need he be aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
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We heard talk about medical students, military 
trained people. You don't require someone to know human 
anatomy. We donft hold to different standards different 
knowledge, background, experience of people. What I believe we 
say is that when you not cut or lacerate or scrape or scratch 
but plunge a knife 8.5 centimeters into someonef s leg and cause 
that kind of a hole, out from which they bleed to death, and do 
nothing, that exhibits a depraved indifference to human life. 
And I just do not see any other intent than one to cause 
serious bodily injury to another when they plunge a knife 8.5 
centimeters into the body of another person. 
Your Honor, Mr. Harms began this trial talking about 
choices and accountability, and the law holds people 
accountable for their choices, and the law tells us the degree 
to which people must be held accountable for their choices. No 
one set out or hoped or believed that any of this would result 
in the tragic death of Daniel Johnson. But the conduct clearly 
occurred by these two defendants, and they must be held 
accountable for their actions, and justice requires this Court 
to consider the facts and apply the law, and we ask this Court 
to find the defendants guilty. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: We will adjourn for the time being. I 
want to see counsel in chambers for just a few minutes. 
(These proceedings were adjourned at 11:24 AM) 
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3 CP: How do you spell your first name? 
4 RC: R A U L . 
5 
6 CP: Middle name? 
7 RC: Roberto 
8 
9 CP: Last name? 
10 RC: C A R I L L O 
11 
12 CP: What's your birthdate? 
13 RC: 9-29-82. 
14 
15 CP: What is your address? 
16 RC: It's 1020 West 700 South. 
17 
18 CP: What is your zip code? 
19 RC: 84104 
20 
21 CP: Who else lives there? 
22 RC: My grandma and my mother. 
23 
24 CP: So it's your mom's house? 
25 RC: No, it's my grandma's house, me and my mom live there. 
26 
27 CP: What's the phone number there? 
28 RC: 328-4094 
29 
30 CP: Do you have a cell phone? 
31 RC: No. 
32 
33 CP: No. Do you have a work phone? 
34 RC: No. Look up at me partner. 
35 
36 CP: Can you do me a favor? Don't call me that, seriously. 
37 Look at the camera Do me a favor, pull your hair back like that. Side to side. 
38 Other side. Ok thanks 
39 RC: You get one more and you're tapped huh? 
40 
41 CP: Perfect thank you. Do you know why you are here? 
42 RC: No. I don't. 
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45 CP: Did you go to a party on Windsor Circle on Friday night? 
46 RC: Where would that be at? 
47 
48 CP: 2700 South and 8th East? 
49 RC: Yea I did. 
50 
51 CP: Well everybody, something bad happened at that party ok and we are 
52 Talking to everybody that was there. Actually nobody stayed around to 
53 Talk to us everybody like left so, but anyway there was a lot of bad 
54 Stuff, a lot of people got punched, stabbed, the Tongans broke in they got 
55 Arrested, [t was a big melee and a big deal, ok. But everybody there is a 
56 Possible suspect alright? So anyway, before we proceed I am going to read 
57 You your rights just so you know that you really don't have to talk to us if 
58 You don't want to. You have the right to remain silent, anything you say 
59 Can and will be used against you in a court of law - do you understand that? 
60 RC: Yes, sir. 
61 
62 CP: You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while 
63 You are being questioned, do you understand that? 
64 RC: Yes, sir. 
65 
66 CP: Ok. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer one will be appointed to represent 
67 You before any questioning if you wish - do you understand that? 
68 RC: Yes, sir. 
69 
70 CP: You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions 
71 Or make any statements. 
72 RC: Yes, sir. 
73 
74 CP: Having your rights in mind will you talk to us and answer our questions? 
75 RC: Yes, sir, I've got nothing to hide. 
76 
77 CP: Ok, it's 14:08. Tell us about the party, what happened and what you saw? 
78 RC: Well, we was there, I was there with some girls. Well, we were at another 
79 Party and some girls said that they knew of somewhere else to party at. 
80 (phone rings - C.Parks) 
81 
82 CP: They are at the back door. 
83 ??: Who? 
84 
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85 CP: Julie. 
86 ??: Ok. 
87 
88 CP: Will you go? I think the robbery room's set up. Alright, you went 
89 To one party ... 
90 RC: Yea, we went to one party and some girls said that they know where another 
91 Party was so we followed them up clear up there and 
92 
93 CP: They took you to another party? 
94 RC: Yea, they took us to that apartment, duplex, whatever it was over there. 
95 And we were sitting there drinking and... 
96 
97 CP: Wait, stop. I lag behind because I can't write that fast. Who were the 
98 Girls? 
99 RC: I can't remember the names, they were just some girls we met up at one of the 
100 Parties. They just wanted to kick it with us. 
101 
102 CP: So you drove yourselves? 
103 RC: Yea, I drove in my car. We drove up there. 
104 
105 CP: Which car is yours? 
106 RC: It's an 82 Cutlass, t-top. 
107 
108 CP: Ok, who was with you? 
109 RC: It was me and my little brother and then there was two other guys that was 
110 With those girls. We just gave them a ride up there. 
I l l 
112 CP: Your little brother, is that Alex? 
113 RC: Yea, Alexandra Carillo. 
114 
115 CP: And the two girls, you don't know their names? 
116 RC: No, there was two other guys with us. I don't know who they were. They 
117 Just needed a ride because one of their cars, the girl's car wouldn't go. 
118 
119 CP: My goodness, how many people made this trip in these two cars? 
120 RC: There was four in my car and five or six girls in the other car. 
121 
122 CP: Do you know any of those girls or their names? 
123 RC: I think one was Stephanie and another was Jessica, or something like that. 
124 
125 CP: Any idea how I can find them and talk to them? 
126 RC: I don't know, we just met them at the party. That was the first time we ever 
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Were meeting them. 
Ok, go ahead. 
And then we were up at the party and one of the girls started acting up because 
I wasn't showing favor to one of them and the one of them that was acting up 
Liked me and so they left and so we sat there and just kicked back there for a 
Second longer trying to find some other girl to kick it with and then some guys 
Came up in there and started acting all crazy. One of them started fighting with 
The guy that lived there, I think his name was Simon, started fighting with the 
Guy that lived there and then they kept asking if we were Tongans or, yea, they 
kept asking if we were Tongans and one of them walked up to my, the one that 
Got in a fight with that guy, Simon, ran up to my brother's face and started trying 
To get crazy with him and then he hit him and then all I remember is just 
Everybody was throwing fists, fighting all the way out. Just fighting and there 
Was three of them on me that was beating me up. There was three fighting, I was 
Fighting three of them and then I was like starting to see everybody push outside 
And then there was some of us outside still fighting and then windows were 
getting broken and all that stuff was going on. And then we went inside, I went 
Inside because I couldn't see my little brother and I went inside to see if he was 
There and then when I was leaving I got in a fight with two other guys in a black 
Car. Two guys and three girls I think was in the car. 
And where was that fight happening? 
That fight was happening outside. You walk like from outside the apartment 
You walk straight and it was like, I remember the street went like that and then 
There was more of the apartments, but it happened like straight in front of the 
Door. 
Straight in front of the door? 
Yea, the door where we were partying at. Just right up straight up. 
Ever see these guys before? 
I've seen one of them. 
That is a bad question, let me back up. The guys that originally started fighting 
The apartment? 
Like the guys, like the Samoans or? 
Yes. That was my question. Are they like Tongan's, Samoans, Islanders? 
I think they were Samoans, they were saying something about Park Village and 
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That's all I know is that a part of Park Village is Samoans. 
But they started the fight inside the apartment? 
Yea. They forced their way up in there. 
That's what I am getting at. They had to break into the apailment to start 
The fight? 
I don't know. I was in the kitchen, the apartment goes like that and there's 
A you walk in the front door and there's like couches here and couches here 
And a entertainment center and then it goes like straight and I know there's 
A bathroom right there because I had to go to the bathroom. There's a kitchen 
Area, the kitchen goes back. I was over here, my little brother and I were sitting 
Over here talking and then all of a sudden we just seen somebody fighting. We 
Seen two people's backs and then I finally realized it was the guy that owned the 
house that was fighting. He was fighting one of the Samoans that was there. 
And that was Simon who was defending his house that you saw fighting? 
Yes. 
Fighting an islander kind of guy? 
Yea, Polynesian everyone called him.. 
I think the correct term is Islander. 
Islander? And then got in a fight. I got in a fight with another guy outside 
And we ... 
This guy you got in a fight with outside, describe him to me? 
Describe him? 
Yes. 
He was bald head, he was like a little bit shorter than me, he was skinnier 
Than I was. 
Was he a white guy? 
No, he was a Mexican. 
How tall was he do you think? 
Probably like about 5'7. 
How much did he weigh do you think? 
I weigh 200 so he was way skinnier than I was so he was probably about 
Roughly, I don't know I don't want to kind of guess at that 
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212 CP: Ok, so just how was he built? Fat or thin or? 
213 RC: Man, he was skinny. Skinnier than I was. 
214 
215 CP: Why were you fighting him? 
216 
217 RC: I don't know, going outside all the commotion and stuff going on, and someone 
218 Says something and I turn around an "whoa, who the fuck are you guys?" and 
219 The guy hit me. He said "don't disrespect me". And I was like "fuck you" so we 
220 Just started fighting. 
221 
222 CP: He hit you first? 
223 RC: Yea, he hit me and we just started fighting. And then after we started fighting 
224 He started getting me good and I just backed off and then I walked around his 
225 Car. 
226 
227 CP: Was he in a car? 
228 RC: Yea, he was in a car. 
229 
230 CP: What kind of car? 
231 RC: I don't know. It was a black car. 
232 
233 CP: I want you to do something for me. This is the duplex, or four plex. 
234 I guess actually because there's two apartments up. And this is the circle 
235 Or the street right here. Draw in where the fight happened outside in the 
236 Front. 
237 RC: Ok, this is the duplex so the door would be right about here, huh? 
238 
239 CP: Yea. 
240 RC: It was just straight up. 
241 
242 CP: Where was the guy's car parked at? 
243 RC: There was several cars in the street trying to leave. And it was like the 
244 Back car. 
245 
246 CP: No, let's say this was the street. Ok? 
247 RC: Now you got me confused. 
248 
249 CP: Ok, this is the front lawn. This is the side lawn, that's the curb. That's 
250 The driveway that goes around to the parking lot OK? 
251 RC: Right up. Where's the street at? 
252 
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The street's right here. 
It was about right here that we fought. It was just like right in front of the 
Door because I remember like the guys were outside like because we were 
fighting. There was a lot of dudes that was there that we were fighting and 
I just fought straight out the door and then into the street. And then like 
everybody started scattering and then some guys started talking some shit and 
then that's why I got in a fight with him. 
Where was his car parked at? 
His car wasn't parked, they were in the, they were trying to drive out. Everybody 
Was trying to drive out of the street. Out onto that one main street, what's that 
Street right here? 
The main street would be here, 2700 South. Down here. So you can't tell me 
Where his car was? 
I don't know where his car was parked at. 
Ok. And I think you said he had another guy and three girls in the car? 
Yea, there was a guy and three girls in the car. 
Do you know any one of those people? 
No, I didn't know who they were. There was just so much confrontation 
Everybody was just tripping trying to figure out who was who and where 
Was everybody (??) 
Ok, somebody got stabbed. Well, actually a lot of people got stabbed at that 
Party. The Tongans that broke in, they all got stabbed. Do you know who 
Stabbed them? 
I don't. There was just so much commotion going on I didn't, I probably even 
Hit a couple of my friends that was there too. 
Just out of the general confusion? 
Yea, there was just a big old rumble just going on right there. Just everybody 
Was swinging. I even got hit in the head with a bottle. Pretty hectic. Big old 
Rumble. And then people started pushing out towards the out of the house too 
And everything. 
Ok, did you see anybody stabbing the Tongans? 
I didn't see nothing. 
How about your brother? 
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294 RC: My brother? I just seen him get hit first. I seen him get hit and then I just seen 
295 him start swinging and then some other guy tried to run up on him and I hit him 
296 And then I hit him and that dude stumbled back and two ran up on him. And I 
297 Kind of ducked down like that and I took a lot of hits to the head, got scratches. 
298 
299 CP: And all this is going on outside? 
300 
301 RC: No, this went on inside that house. And then everybody started, there was like 
302 A big old fight like I kind of slipped out. I slipped out of those guys and went 
303 Behind some other dude that was there and then I just seen everybody fighting 
304 And I seen my brother's shirt and so I just started running up and punching 
305 And then we just all went out to the street. 
306 
307 CP: Ok. I think it was during the fight in the front yard that somebody got stabbed 
308 Really badly and they wound up dying. Did you see anybody get stabbed in the 
309 Front yard? 
310 RC: I didn't see nobody get stabbed. I still was fighting. The fighting was going on 
311 And I was just worried about who was in front of me and trying to keep my own 
312 So I wouldn't get beat up. Because there was bottles flying, people getting hit 
313 With bottles and everything and I was just trying to get out of there as safe as 
314 Possible. 
315 
316 CP: So how did you get out? 
317 RC: How did I get out? 
318 
319 CP: Yes. 
320 RC: Forced my way out fighting. 
321 
322 CP: But how did you get away from the scene because you were like gone when 
323 The police got there? 
324 RC: Oh no, I didn't. At first we left everybody got out of the way, some guy hit a 
325 Some guy was in a car and ran over another car and hit another car and then he 
326 Drove off and he got, we were right behind him and I jumped in my car and 
327 turned and we went and turned right and we went down the street a little bit and 
328 I realized I'd lost my necklace and so we came back around. I was there when 
329 The officer was there. I told him, me and my brother told him we came back to 
330 Get my necklace because I'd lost my necklace and so we found my necklace and 
331 We left. 
332 
333 CP: So you talked to the cop? 
334 RC: Yea, the cop was like "what are you doing here" and I said I lost my necklace 
335 Over here and my brother got out and found it and I turned around because I 
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Remember like the street was a circle type and I turned around and I came back 
Around and then we got in the car and we just drove off. 
That car that ran into the other car on the circle, did you see who was in that 
car? 
Oh no, I just know there was one guy that was in there. 
Just one guy? 
Yea, there was a guy that was in there. 
What kind of car was it that hit the other cars then? 
I'm trying to think. I think it was a green colored car. It looked like it 
Could have been like a Honda Civic or something like that. 
Well, I am very interested in the fight that happened out front because 
It was outside in the front where this guy was stabbed. He was stabbed 
In the leg, a dumb place to get stabbed, but what happened was the stab 
Wound nicked an artery and the guy instead of stopping and like bandaging 
up his leg, applying a tourniquet or something he tried to drive home and 
He bled to death is what happened. It was a stupid thing. He didn't need to 
die but he did. Ok, and whoever stabbed him I'm sure didn't intend to kill 
Him. It was just an unfortunate thing, almost like an accident ok? So do 
You know who that person was that stabbed him? 
No I don't. It was so much confrontation and commotion and I didn't have 
My eyes everywhere just in front of me trying to get up out of there. 
Ok. Well there were a lot of people that actually did witness the stabbing 
Because there was a lot of people that was there and they told us who did it 
And it was you. 
Who me? 
It was you. You didn't mean to kill him, but you did stab him in the leg and 
We have eye witnesses that saw you stab him in the leg and there you go. 
I mean you didn't mean to do it, but it happened. 
For real? 
For real. You didn't mean to but you did and you've been given up and that's 
Why we sent AP&P out to get you. 
So Someone died? 
Yes. The kid you stabbed in the leg he bled to death 
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I didn't have no knife or nothing, I didn't. 
No, let me tell you how you had a knife. Your brother Alex handed you the 
Knife and then you stabbed him with the knife that Alex handed you. Ok? 
You were seen doing it. I mean, you think back in your own memory about 
How many people were out front and how many people were in the car watching 
What happened and you just did it and that's why you're here talking to me. 
Now, I want to impress upon you, no shit, you didn't mean for it to happen ok, 
But it did. And what you are charged with now is going to depend a lot 
Upon how honest you are right now, ok? 
I didn't have no knife, sir, I'm being honest. I didn't.... 
You had it and you stabbed him. You were seen doing it. Don't tell me 
You didn't do it because you have been identified. 
I'm not trying to lie to fuck you on. I know you guys think I did it but 
No, we know you did it. Do you know how we know you did it? 
How? 
Because of your hair and your joker tattoo on your forearm. That's how 
Much you have been identified. You did it, ok? You did it. Why do 
You think you're here? You did it, you were seen, you've been given up. 
And not only that but you told people about it, ok? 
I don't talk to nobody I didn't have no knife, all I was doing was figliting 
Trying to get my way out of there. I honestly don't remember having a 
Knife. I don't. 
But you remember being in a fight in the front yard right? 
I remember fighting, yea. 
Well, the kid's car was a very dark dark green car that looked like a black 
Car that had two girls, actually had three girls in it. So that sounds like the 
Guy that you were fighting in the front yard with and the stabbing victim. 
That's what it sounds like to me. 
(crying) 
Now listen, this doesn't have to be the most terrible awful thing in your 
whole life, ok? 
I've never killed nobody man. 
Well, you never killed nobody before and you didn't mean to do it, ok? 
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We have the witnesses that say what you did. You ran over and stabbed 
Him when he was in the front seat of his car and you only stabbed him in 
The leg. You didn't mean to do it, ok? But you know you don't want to go 
down here saying you didn't do it because everybody is going to get on the 
Stand and say you did. 
Yea? 
And you are going to look like a fool on the stand. (No, Come on in - Det. 
Siebeneck enters room) And you're going to look like a fool on the stand 
because we are going to put on all these people that were there at the sight and the 
people that were in the car 
We are going to put on all the people that saw you do it and then you're going to 
get up on the stand and say you didn't do it and you are going to look like a total 
fool. 
I don't remember, honestly I just don't remember it. 
Well, I told you all about it and how it happened. Yea, you remember because 
You told somebody about it afterwards. 
I didn't talk to nobody about it, I don't remember having the knife or nothing on 
me. You know I'm not going to sit here and try to bullshit you guys, you got 
witnesses and I know that's going to fuck me but I honestly in my mind... 
Now, let me tell you something. You've been through the system a couple of 
times right? You know that the law loves people that like take responsibility 
for their actions, right? You can go down saying I didn't do it, I didn't do it, 
I didn't do it. And you are going to get screwed in the end because the judge is 
going to say "you know, this guy's just not getting it and not taking 
responsibility". But if you tell your side of the story "yea, there was a big fight 
and I got hit and I lost and yea, I had a knife and I stabbed him in the leg. Jesus 
I didn't intend to kill him but it was a bad accident." If you go down saying that 
story it's going to go a lot better for you. Because that's the truth. 
Yea, I want to, I honestly there's so much commotion, there's I honestly don't 
remember. You know what I'm saying? I'm not going to sit here and call you a 
liar or the witnesses a liar, apparently they seen me but... 
How can you not remember? 
There's was just so much going on. 
That's not a good story either, you don't think you can get away with that? 
I know, but I'm being as truthful as I am. All my other stuff I've been 
fucked around with, you know what I'm saying, I've been truthful about it 
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462 In all my cases that I've been fucked with. And honestly I don't remember 
463 stabbing him, if I do remember stabbing him I would admit to it because 
464 
465 Apparently there's witnesses. 
466 
467 CP: Well, there's another problem here I want you to consider ok, and that's your 
468 brother Alex. Do you like Alex? 
469 RC: That's my little brother. I love the hell out of him. 
470 
471 CP: Witnesses saw him hand you the knife and do you know what that means for 
472 Alex? 
473 RC: Accessory? 
474 
475 CP: In Utah it's called "parties". It means he's a party to the offense and he's going 
476 Down for murder also, that's what it means, ok? Somebody's got to take " 
477 responsibility and if you guys are going to sit here and say "we didn't do it, we 
478 didn't do it, we don't remember we don't remember" then that's it. We've got 
479 To take the hard stance. You are forcing us into a corner here you know. 
480 RC: Well if that's that then, if they seen me stab him then it was me that did it then. 
481 
482 CP: Ok, well we're getting somewhere but that's a little shy of really taking 
483 responsibility. Ok? Now look, Vic and I have talked to a lot of people. You 
484 are not the first guy that we've had to talk to like this and I know it's horrible 
485 and I know that you are scared, and Jesus I know you're frightened. You've 
486 Got to be scared shitless right now. 
487 RC: Fuck, I've never killed nobody, that fucking makes me feel bad. 
488 
489 CP: Did you intend to kill him this time? 
490 RC: I didn't, all I was fighting, I was just trying to get out of there. 
491 
492 CP: You've got to be truthful, tell me your story? 
493 RC: I am being truthful... 
494 
495 CP: Tell me your side of the events, tell me what happened? 
496 RC: I was.We were up in the house, some people forced their way in, we fought. 
497 I went outside, you know what I am saying, we fought and we went outside. 
498 There was some other, there was, I seen two dudes and three girls that was in the 
499 car , in a dark car, and we started fighting and one of the dudes said something to 
500 me and he hit me and we started fighting and that's all I remember is just fighting. 
501 
502 CP: Well that's not going to be good enough. Let me refresh your memory. He was 
503 sitting in his own car when it happened ok? 
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504 RC: That's where I got hit ok, I got hit and we started fighting and he got out. We 
505 
506 Started fighting. 
507 
508 CP: Yea, but he got back inside his own car. Look, I'm not supposed to give you 
509 all the details of the crime. We know all the details of what happened, ok? 
510 But you are supposed to tell me, I'm not supposed to tell you alright? You want 
511 To help yourself out and especially do you want to help your brother out let's 
512 hear the truth. (Phone ringing in background) 
513 RC: I told you the truth. 
514 
515 
516 CP: You do know he's here don't you? 
517 RC: Who? 
518 
519 CP: Your brother? 
520 RC: Yea, he was.... 
521 
522 CP: Your brother is here and I've already talked to him somewhat on this and I 
523 need to wait for him, he's the case agent on this and we got to a really critical 
524 point he and I and I need for him to come in with me so we can finish our talk... 
525 VS: He's not having a problem keeping his mouth shut, ok? So what we are trymg 
526 to do is give you the option here, the ability to kind of mitigate some of your... 
527 You know like he said, the law likes it when people take responsibility for their 
528 actions. The courts definitely look favorably upon them. Don't make us go the 
529 hard road and you 
530 RC: I'm not. Because I know it's going to fuck me in the long run you know 
531 
532 VS: Definitely. 
533 RC: If I did stab him, you know what I am saying? If I did stab him you know what 
534 I am saying I want to, I know it probably would have been an accident or 
535 something. I honestly don't remember. 
536 
537 CP: Ok, let's be crystal clear and focus on this ok? The law focuses on intent, what 
538 Was going through your mind at the moment that it happened ok? And right now 
539 it looks like fairly premeditated murder ok? And the reason it looks like that ok 
540 is that someone, your brother, handed you the knife and you had to open up his 
541 car door so that proves prior intent. So that's murder, that's like aggravated 
542 murder you know. The jury is going to say he had the knife in his hand, he 
543 opened the door, he clearly intended to kill this guy. And what we want out 
544 of you is we want the intent of what was going through your mind at the time 
545 because of where he was stabbed, you know, that tell's us that you didn't intend 
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To kill him. But you are dancing around the whole issue here. 
I'm not. If the people seen me, if this people seen me then they would .... 
They did see you do it. They saw you, I told you they saw you. 
I know but the thing is... 
In fact I described to you how you did it, what more do you want me to tell you? 
You did it, I want you to admit it. 
Did they say they seen us fighting was there both swinging? 
Yes, that's why we are trying to go around like this, we are frying to get your 
In your mind of what you did or what you were thinking at the moment that you 
did it because it's going to have a tremendous effect on your future and what you 
are charged with. You know you are going to be charged, you are going from 
here to jail. But are you going to go to jail for first degree murder for the rest 
of your life or are you going to go for manslaughter which is like a couple of 
Years you know? That's what we are getting at here. And you axe dancing 
around the issues here and you are... 
WelUjLypu gays-^o^mcrTTSo^you got people"5 
It's not "if, we got you ok? 
I know you guys got me and there's the witnesses saying they seen it you know 
So why am I gojingJiLsiUi^e and bullshit you and say that I did it or I didn't do 
t2_ 
We want you to tell us what you did and why? And we want to hear it out of 
your own lips because we don't know what your intent was when you did it. 
We want to hear what you was thinking? 
I was just fighting, trying to get up out of there 
What were you thinking when you opened the car door? 
I got hit in my mouth, what I was thinking was hitting the guy back. 
So you did open the car door, right? 
Yea. 
Ok, and what were you thinking when you opened the car door? What were 
You going to do? 
I was going to hit the guy back for hitting me. 
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Ok, and the knife in your hand.. .why didn't you just hit him with your fist 
Instead of stabbing him? 
Honestly, I'm drawing a blank there. 
Were you like wild, out of control? Angry? What? 
I was scared. There was a whole bunch of shit going on. I didn't know, 
I know how those gangsters, I know how gangsters are saying there's guns, 
everything, you know what I am saying so I was Just trying to get out of there as 
safe as possible. 
Ok, let's back up. You did open the car door right? 
Yea. I opened the car door. 
And you did stab him in the leg, right? 
I guess I did. 
Ok, alright. When you stabbed him in the leg did you intend to kill him? 
No. 
What was your intent when you stabbed him in the leg? 
What was my intent? I honest, I hate this kind of thing 
I know you're scared to death, you're scared to death. Your options are... 
I was scared too when all that shit happened you know. I didn't know what 
Was going on what was happening I was just trying to fight my way out so 
I could go. 
Ok, listen to me ok, let's focus here on your intent. You open the door 
And stabbed him in the leg. When you stabbed him in the leg did you intend 
To kill him? 
No. 
No, ok. What did you, what was your intent when you stabbed him in the leg, ok, 
and your options are - 1 wanted to hurt him, I wanted to teach him a lesson, I 
Wanted to maim him - what were you thinking when you stabbed him in the leg? 
Just self defense, you know, I just trying to get out of there, just, I was scared. 
Ok, now listen, I want you to back up and think about this. You are going to tell 
A jury that you opened a car door, a guy sitting in his car with the door shut, and 
You open the door and you stab him in the leg as you were defending yourself? 
That's not going to fly, Raul, ok? We really don't want to screw you here, Raul, 
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630 Really we don't, ok? 
631 RC: That's what's happening though, I don't... 
632 
633 CP: Your options are (tape ends) that - 1 really didn't intend for him to die, 
634 I wanted to impress his girlfriend - you tell me, what was your intention 
635 When you stabbed him in the leg? 
636 RC: Save myself, because I didn't know who was who or what was what 
637 I'm saying and that's kind of, I don't know you know, I'm not trying to 
638 bullshit you, you guys got me for this, but honestly I don't remember 
639 having the knife. All I remember is fighting. 
640 
641 CP: Were you drunk? 
642 RC: A little bit. 
643 
644 CP: Ok, were you like out of control? 
645 RC: Yea, I was real scared. I was scared for my life. With all that shit that 
646 Was going on inside the house and then outside, I didn't know who was 
647 There. It was dark, I don't know what the hell was going on. 
648 
649 CP: What happened, wait a minute let me write some things down. Alright, so 
650 You remember you did open the car door when he's sitting in his car, 
651 RC: I remember that yes. 
652 
653 CP: Ok, and then do you remember hitting him? 
654 RC: Yea, I hit him in the face and then he started swinging back at me and then 
655 We were fighting and we turned around and he kicked me in my face, he 
656 Kicked me in my face twice and he got out and we started fighting again and 
657 I backed up because someone pulled me, someone pulled me and I backed up 
658 And then the guy just drove off. Everybody started driving out. 
659 
660 CP: Ok, so you open the door, punch him in the face, he hits you back... 
661 RC: Yea, we started scuffling like that... 
662 
663 CP: And he kicks you while he's in the driver's seat? 
664 RC: Yea, he turned around like that and he kicked me right in my face. And then 
665 I grabbed his foot and he kicked me with his other foot and I stumbled back 
666 And started swinging with him again and then somebody just pulled me back 
667 And I turned around and then I turned back around and all the cars are driving 
668 Off. 
669 
670 CP: So, were you guys like, after he kicked you in the face did he like get out of 
671 The car and you guys were like duking it out again on the front lawn? 
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672 RC: No, not on the front lawn, in the street. 
673 
674 
675 CP: In the street? 
676 RC: Yea, we were in the street. 
677 
678 CP: How did you guys separate? 
679 RC: Someone pulled me back like that and I was seeing who it was, I didn't know 
680 Who it was. I was going to turn around and just start fighting again and then 
681 They pulled me back and it was some other dude with short hair and then I 
682 Turned back around and all the cars started driving off. And then we jumped 
683 In our car and we all drove off too. 
684 
685 CP: Ok. You do not remember having a knife in your hand? 
686 RC: Honestly I don't. And I know that's going to fuck me but honestly I really 
687 Don't remember it. 
688 
689 CP: Do you remember punching him in the leg with your fist? 
690 RC: I was just punching, I didn't see where every punch was going. I just remember 
691 swinging it with him. 
692 
693 CP: Well, you know you're actually a good guy and what we've told you here is 
694 really true. We don't want to see you go to prison for the rest of your life over 
695 this ok? I guess you've been as truthful with us as you can and we appreciate 
696 it. Answer a question for me. Maybe I misunderstand this whole incident. 
697 There is a party with a lot of people. The Tongans break in, there's one hell of 
698 a big fight, but then the Tongans all run out and they get in a car and they flee. 
699 They left. So why was there still a fight going on after all the Tongans left? 
700 RC: Well, There wasn't. We went outside and there was still fighting There was 
701 someone that was inside the house that went out there because I remember even 
702 The guy that lived there was out there at the corner. 
703 
704 CP: Well, what's been explained to me is that the Tongans ran right out to their 
705 car and took off and so I was confused on why there was still a fight going on 
706 in the front yard. So what you are saying is that they didn't run right to their 
707 car, that the Tongans were still fighting in the front yard. Is that what you are 
708 saying? 
709 RC: Yea, there was still some out there like there was still a whole bunch of them 
710 left out there. Like a whole bunch of people went out there. There was more 
711 than like five or six of them and I was out there too because I was like right 
712 from where the kitchen was I went to like, there was the kitchen and then I 
713 went out and just started seeing everybody, there was still a bunch of people in 
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714 front of the door fighting, people on the ground and everything and then I seen 
715 my brother's shirt and I seen some guy hitting him so I just ran up and stalled 
716 
717 hitting the guy and then everybody was just like pushed out there and I got 
718 pushed out there with those guys and then I was still fighting one more. And 
719 I heard the windows breaking and stuff and then everybody just started running 
720 and then there was car's that was leaving and just a whole bunch of shit. And 
721 then someone says something and I turned around and I didn't know if it was 
722 them or not and I walked, and then I got hit and figured it was probably one 
723 of them and some other people that was out there with me and I just started 
724 fighting with them. 
725 
726 CP: Ok, this guy in this car leaving with the girls, why didn't you just let him go? 
727 RC: Well that was the girls that we went with left right before that and then we was 
728 calling some other girls, I was trying to call for some other girls to kick it with 
729 because we were planning on having sex with those girls, you know what I'm 
730 saying, we was at a party, drinking a little bit, trying to have fun. And then they 
731 left and then I just tried to hit some more girls up and all that and then after that 
732 the people, those Samoans or Islanders came and then all that shit happened. 
733 
734 CP: Yea, but my question is, this guy is sitting in his car with these girls and trying 
735 to get the hell out of there. Obviously you guys had already fought in the front 
736 lawn but why go back and open his car door and screw with him again? 
737 RC: I was walking out to the street to get to my car. Because I'm on probation you 
738 know what I'm saying and being in that kind of situation it's a violation. And 
739 I tried to get up out of there before all of it, all that shit happened. And when I 
740 realized ray little brother wasn't out there I went up to the door and then we 
741 left, and then all that shit happened and then we left. Got in a fight with another 
742 guy there. Just smashed out. 
743 
744 CP: Do you have any questions? 
745 VS: I do. I guess maybe I'm confused, but you got into a fight with this guy who's 
746 in his car, alright, with these girls. You go out, open the car door and you guiys 
747 start fighting again. You've already essentially told us that you stabbed the guy 
748 but you weren't sure why, you weren't sure where, and now you've kind of 
749 backed off from that. I guess I'm a little confused. 
750 RC: Well he was over there saying that people seen me stab him. I don't remember 
751 stabbing him. But I'm not going to say this stuff on tape. 
752 
753 VS: But you remember having a knife.. .how about if I turn the tape off, you going to 
754 talk to me decently then? You don't have to lie to me? 
755 RC: I'm not going to lie. 
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757 (Tape ends - starts again) 
758 
759 VS: We know what happened. We know that there was an altercation. We know 
760 That you opened up the car door. We know that you ultimately stabbed him 
761 In the, while he was sitting in the car. What we don't know is what was going 
762 through your mind? Were you " I'm going to kill this mother fucker" or "take 
763 that. " That's a big difference. On the spectrum of things "Take that" is so 
764 much further away from "I'm going to kill this mother fucker". 
765 RC: I understand. 
766 
767 VS: And what, you ended up stabbing him? That leans more towards this end of 
768 the thing but where you are not even willing to meet us anywhere and tell us 
769 your side of the story, that puts us back up here automatically because 
770 RC: I know 
771 
772 VS: I mean you're not helping yourself out at all. 
773 RC: I know. And there's witnesses that seen me stab him? I, there's just so 
774 much commotion you know what I'm saying. I don't remember everything. 
775 
776 VS: Well, your own brother can't keep his mouth shut, man. That's why I was gone 
777 so long, but we got to a spot where I have to let him come in and let him finish it 
778 up because this is his case. And I want him to hear. I don't want to have to write 
779 The report. Do you see what I'm saying? 
780 RC: Well, yea, and if my brother's telling on me then he's saving his own skin, but 
781 the people... 
782 
783 VS: He's not telling on you, he's telling us the truth, the way it happened. And so 
784 you know when he goes up, the judge is going to say "ok, this guy he's a man, 
785 He's alright, he's telling us what happened, he ain't trying to hide behind nothing. 
786 This is the way he said it happened, I think he's being honest with us" , he's more 
787 on this end of the spectrum. He's not way up here. He didn't think you were 
788 going to kill him either, man. He thought you were just going to stab him or 
789 threaten him and it ended up ultimately we know that you stabbed him and 
790 we don't think you meant to kill him. If we thought that you meant to kill him 
791 we wouldn't even be here having this discussion. You would already be in 
792 the bucket. You know. If we thought, if you had stabbed him in the chest or 
793 the throat or something like that, we wouldn't even be here. We wouldn't be 
794 wasting our time. Because there's no doubt at all what the intent was there. 
795 What we are trying to do here, man, is to get your intent. Find out what was 
796 going through your mind, what you actually meant to do because if we know 
797 What you actually meant to do, it keeps you down here man, in our opinion. 
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We don't think it was intentional, do you see what I am saying? So you open 
The car door, your brother hands you this knife, then what happens? 
Well, he, it didn't go like that. He hit me, opened the car door, I went in there 
and I hit him in his face, you know what I'm saying? 
Sure 
He started swinging back at me. We started swinging so we were over there 
fighting. That's honestly all that I can remember. You could say I blacked 
out or theie's just some stuff that I can't remem... 
You can remember the minor things like windows breaking and... 
How man times he kicked you in the face... 
how many times he kicked you in the face, but you can't remember taking a knife 
from your brother and just stabbing him in the leg? Maybe to get him off of you? 
maybe to get him to quit kicking you or something? 
Maybe at that point I just wigged out you know probably just got pissed off and 
grabbed it. Honestly I don't remember and I know this is fucking me right now 
you know what I am saying but I am being truthful as hell. 
How much time are we gonna waste on this guy? You know, you are not a stupid 
guy 
I'm not so why am I going to sit here, everybody's seen me do it, why am I going 
To sit here and say I didn't do it, you know what I'm saying? 
Right, but you're not stupid, and you know we're not stupid right? And you 
know that we know what happened. You know that we have witnesses that saw 
and you know that we have people as well that know what happened. So 
everybody really knows what happened. The only thing we don't know, man 
is why? What was your intent? What were you trying to do? Were you just 
trying to get him to quit kicking you in the chest, in the chin or were you trying to 
kill him? 
No, I was just trying to get out of there. No I wasn't trying to kill nobody. I'm 
not like that. Even in the house you know what I'm saying? I didn't have no 
knife or nothing so I was just fighting. 
So you're still saying that you didn't have a knife in the car? 
I guess I did have a knife 
You guess? I mean that's kind of... 
I don't remember, I mean I just, we were just fighting, there was a whole bunch of 
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commotion going, you know what I am saying? If I had a knife, you know, 
if I stabbed him, It wasn't intent. You know what I am saying? I didn't mean for 
nobody dying, I didn't mean to stab nobody. If I did stab people you know, I'm 
not that kind of a person. I would like to fight more. 
Do you realize that car was full of people, just full of people sitting right there 
about as close to you and me as they were to you? Probably closer? 
I know there was people in the car. 
It makes for some pretty damn good witnesses,you know that? 
I know and that's why I don't want to kind of contradict my story, you know, 
or have kind of contradict stories you know because ... 
I don't want you to contradict a story, I just want you to tell us what happened 
with the knife you know? 
You've already admitted you did it, why do you have such a hard time saying 
it, why do you have such a hard time? 
I don't remember a knife in my hand. I don't honestly. And I know this is 
fucking me and I know that there is people that seen me with the 
knife. I don't honestly remember having the knife. 
Stop worrying about people fucking you and start worrying about how you can 
mitigate your circumstances a little bit. How you can alleviate some of your 
Mitigating circumstances... 
Undermine some of your sentencing 
This is really important to your future, I mean look at me ok? 
I know, I got a four year old son and then I got another one on the way, 
I know. 
Look at my face, ok , if you are not truthful with us you're going to be as old as 
me before you get out of prison? 
I know. 
Ok, prison time for murder vs. prison time for manslaughter. There's a hell of a 
big difference there. 
I know, and that's why I want the least time. 
But we want you to be honest you know? 
I'm not like that, I'm more of a fighter you know. See my finger is 
messed up from fighting? I've got scars there from fighting. I love the fight. 
I'm not a person to stab somebody or shoot somebody. I'm a man you know 
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882 and that's the way I like to go it. Knuckle up. And if I had a knife you know 
883 
884 I'm sony for having the knife and if I stabbed him I'm sorry for it. 
885 It wasn't intent. 
886 
887 CP: Well there's no "if I had a knife" you did have a knife. 
888 RC: I don't remember a knife. 
889 
890 CP: We know you had a knife. Come on, you're nearly there for Christ sakes. 
891 RC: And I'm trying to get the best way out of this that I can you know. 
892 
893 CP: Ok, stop, you're nearly there. You had a knife right? 
894 RC: I had a knife. 
895 
896 CP: There you go. And you stabbed him in the leg, didn't you? 
897 RC: I stabbed Mm in the leg. 
898 
899 CP: Alright, and why did you do that? 
900 RC: Probably to get him out of there so he'd stop hitting me, stop getting the 
901 Best of me, you know what I'm saying? 
902 
903 CP Ok. And where was he sitting when you stabbed him with the knife? 
904 RC: hi his car. 
905 
906 CP: Ok, now why is that so hard to say? 
907 RC: It ain't. 
908 
909 CP: Ok. Well, you've admitted to the whole thing ok? So, what were you 
910 thinking when you stabbed him? 
911 RC: Just trying to get out of there can't even talk.... Get out of there with the 
912 least harm done to me you know what I'm saying just try to get up out of 
913 there as safe as possible. 
914 
915 CP: I don't think that's quite true. I think we are really near the truth but I think 
916 that you are having a hard time saying it. You were just going to get him back. 
917 It was just to get back for him whooping you on the front lawn. 
918 RC: Well, I didn't fight no one. I fought, I was fighting some Tongan and like 
919 Tan or whites on the front lawn. And then we went out to the street. We 
920 Were all fighting and then we all went out. There was some people out there. 
921 We all went out there. There was the Samoans because they were all by the 
922 Door and then there was the people that was inside the house with us. We 
923 started a fighting and it was like the fight was just like from the kitchen to the 
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front room, it was all just right there. And then like people just started going 
Out there and one of, we started fighting and it was I remember, I even 
remember getting hit in the back of the head with someone in blue, he was 
wearing blue. Because I went out, I was closer to the door, and I like to 
fight, you know what I'm saying, so I was just trying to get out of there too 
because I know how those PVCC's are, you know what I am saying? they are 
like to shoot. You know what I'm saying? And I'm trying to get the hell 
out of there too because I don't want to get shot and everything. And I don't 
even know what the hell the whole fight started over. You know what I'm 
saying, there's people that just walked in and then I seen... 
Ok, we don't want to go over that we know all of that. We're just focusing 
on events in the front yard ok? Now, I thought you said that the guy that 
was sitting in the car, right? The guy that you stabbed in the leg, right? I 
thought you said that you fought with him in the front yard before he got in 
his car? 
No. I got in a fight with him right next to his car when everybody was leaving. 
People were leaving and I was walking in the street, I was walking in the street 
and he said something and I was like "what?" 
Stop. Was he sitting in his car when he said that something? 
Yea. 
So he was in the car with these girls and then he said something to you and 
then he said something to you and then you walked over to the car? 
No, I was already in the street from the fight you know People started scattering 
and I was out in the street, just like tripping, like what the fuck just happened? 
And then I was walking in the street, on the side of the street, like that in the 
Street because there was cars that was trying to drive off. There was a whole 
bunch of cars, there was like two or three that was leaving 
Kind of like a logjam? 
Yea it was right there and that's where it happened, I never said I fought this guy 
in the grass. I fought him in the street. 
So he's sitting in his car and you're on foot and you exchange words? 
Yea. 
And then you walk over and open the door and start fighting? 
No, I was on the driver's side, the driver's side and that's when he said something 
and then he hit me and so I opened the door and started hitting him back. 
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968 CP: Did he start hitting you through the window or something? 
969 RC: Yes. 
970 
971 CP: What did he hit you with? 
972 RC: His fist. 
973 
974 CP: So then you opened the door and stabbed him, not meaning to kill him but 
975 stabbed him? Not meanign to kill him. 
976 RC: Yea. I'm not a murderer you know I like to fight. 
977 
978 CP: What the hell you doing with a knife? What the hell were you doing? 
979 RC: There was just so much commotion and confrontation going on I was just 
980 trying to get out of there safe. 
981 
982 CP: Were you in his way? I mean were you like standing in front of his car so 
983 he couldn't turn and leave? 
984 RC: Uh huh. 
985 
986 CP: Then why would he exchange words with you? 
987 RC: I don't know. I don't know. There was just so much shit going on. 
988 
989 VS: What did he say to you? 
990 RC: He said like "who the fuck are you?" or "what the fuck do you want?" or 
991 some shit like that. And I was like "what?" 
992 
993 CP: So he called you on or something? 
994 RC: Yea, he said something and I was like "what" as I was walking by and I looked 
995 in at him and he hit me. 
996 
997 CP: That would make me angry too. So he said "who the fuck are you"? 
998 RC: Yea he said "who the fuck are you" or "what the fuck you want? Some shit 
999 like that. 
1000 
1001 VS: Just popping off? 
1002 RC: Yea, just popping off at the mouth you know and then when I got up closer to him 
1003 I was saying "well who the fuck are you" and everybody's adrenalin pumping 
1004 seeing as we just got in a big old scuffle and so I was like what the fuck and then 
1005 I got hit and so I just started hitting him back. 
1006 
1007 CP: So he hit you through his open drivers window? 
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1008 VS: That's kind of chicken shit isn't it? Wouldn't even get out of the car. 
1009 
1010 RC: It was kind of chicken shit for me to stab him too. It wasn't something 
1011 I intended or nothing. 
1012 
1013 CP: Ok? here's something else. I was told by witness, one of the many witnesses, 
1014 That he was sitting in his car in the driveway getting ready to leave and you 
1015 Just walked over to his car, took the knife from your brother, opened the door, 
1016 stabbed him in the leg. Like that. No words exchanged, no fighting between 
1017 you. Just opened the door and bang like that. Is that true or not? 
1018 RC: No, that's not true, the cars were all like trying to go out to that main street 
1019 that was right there. Like I remember coming from 27th south and 
1020 then turned where the Maverick was and we went up a little and then the 
1021 street went up like this and then it went around like that. The cars were all 
1022 trying to drive out. There wasn't nobody in the driveway, I didn't see anybody 
1023 in the driveway. I wasn't even in the driveway. I went from the grass into the 
1024 street. And then all that fighting happened and then I went back 
1025 
1026 CP: Ok, let me get this again. This guy he definitely kicked you in the face and 
1027 He fought with you before you stabbed him? 
1028 RC: Yea. 
1029 
1030 CP: Alright, that's all I have. 
1031 
1032. 
1033 That will end the interview. The time now is 15:03 
1034 
1035 CP: I'm back on tape at 15:03. Did you know it was Daniel Johnson when you 
1036 stabbed him? 
1037 RC: I didn't know who he was but after I heard you know that shit happened at 
1038 that party and read and stuff in the newspaper and I seen his name I didn't know. 
1039 
1040 CP: At the time you were fighting with him, at the time of the confrontation, who 
1041 did you think it was? 
L042 RC: I didn't know who it was. 
1043 
1044 CP: Did you think he was a Tongan or with the Tongans? 
045 RC: I didn't know who he was or what he was. He just said something and I 
046 looked, got hit and just started fighting again. 
047 
048 CP: Ok, so it had nothing to do with like a conflict over girlfriends, drugs, 
049 drug debts, nothing like that? 
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050 RC: Nothing like that. 
051 
052 CP: He was just a guy that mouthed off to you? 
053 RC: And we just started fighting and I didn't know if he was one of the Tongans 
1054 or with the Tongans or not. I just didn't recognize him or nothing. So I was 
L055 like "who the fuck are you?" 
1056 
1057 CP: Ok, I think actually that's going to make it a lot easier for everybody to take. 
1058 If you know what I mean? 
1059 RC: Not only that, when I started reading the stuff in the newspapers I know who 
1060 his family is, you know I know who his Dad is, his uncles, you know what 
1061 I'm saying? And my mom and his Dad and the Johnson family are real good 
1062 friends. There's even one of my cousins that, well one of my cousin's is a 
1063 Johnson. I'm not going to try to kill an old friend of the family, you know 
1064 what I'm saying? I'm not that type of person. 
1065 
1066 CP: So you really didn't know who it was? 
1067 RC: I didn't know who it was. 
1068 
1069 CP: Alright, that will end the interview 15:04 is the time. 
1070 
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